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Defining "Co-Party" Within 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(g): 
Are Cross-Claims Between Original Defendants 
and Third-Party Defendants Allowable? 
JOHN D. BESSLER* 
INTRODUCTION 
The courts cannot agree on whether the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
allow cross-chums between ongrnal defendants- and third-party defendants. 
Some courts allow cross-chums between such parties, I while other courts 
restnct cross-claIms to defendants on the same level of the caption.2 Still 
other courts allow cross-claims between ongrnal defendants and thIrd-party 
defendants only under certaIn cIrcumstances.3 At the heart of the controversy 
IS the term "co-party," whIch the Federal Rules leave undefined. 
A good starting pornt for the analysIs of this Issue IS the case of Jeub v. 
BIG Foods, Inc.4 In that case, the plaIntiffs sought to recover damages 
agaInst a restaurant for food poisoning. Defendant BIG Foods brought in 
its supplier, Swift and Co., as a thIrd-party defendant under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 14(a). BIG Foods' rndemnification claim was based on 
an allegation that Swift had supplied BIG Foods with a contaminated ham 
that the defendant had subsequently served to the plaintiffs. S The Jeub 
court's holding that BIG Foods' thIrd-party complaInt agaInst Swift should 
stand gave effect to the language of Rule 14(a), which permits the Impleader 
of a party "who is or may be liable."6 Concluding that Rule 14(a)'s purpose 
is to allow courts to determrne the nghts of all partIes rn one proceeding, 
the Jeub court recognized that the only alternative was to await the outcome 
of the plaIntiffs' origrnal suit before allowrng BIG Foods to sue Swift for 
indemnification should the first suit prove successful.7 The court brushed 
* J.D. Candidate, 1991, Indiana Uruversity School of Law at Bloonungton; B.A., 1988, 
Uruversity of Minnesota. 
1. See mfra notes 40-57 and accompanymg text. 
2. See mfra notes 29-39 and accompanymg text. 
3. See mfra notes 58-77 and accompanymg text. 
4. 2 F.R.D. 238 (D. Minn. 1942). 
5. [d. at 239. 
6. [d. at 240 (emphasiS added). 
7. [d. at 241. 
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aSIde that alternative, decIding that Rule 14(a) "was promulgated to avoId 
thIS very cIrcuity of proceeding. "8 
Since Jeub, courts addressmg the same questIon have uniformly held that 
a defendant may assert a chum agamst a thIrd-party defendant pursuant to 
Rule 14(a) before the liability of the ongmal defendant IS established.9 
LikewIse, It IS undisputed that an ongmal or thIrd-party defendant may 
cross-claIm agaInst a co-defendant on the same level of the captIon,1O and 
that a thIrd-party defendant may counterclaIm agaInst the defendant who 
ongmally brought m that thIrd-party defendant.u However, a difficulty 
arIses where plaIntiffs like the ones m Jeub sue two defendants mstead of 
one m theIr ongmal actIOn. In that situatIOn, suppose that the plaIntiffs 
had eaten at two mdependently owned restaurants-each with the same 
supplier-and that the plaIntiffs were unaware of whIch restaurant caused 
theIr harm. Could the second defendant Implead the supplier VIa Rule 14(a) 
if the first defendant had already done SO?12 
8. [d., see also LASA Per L'Industna Del Manno Socleta Per AzIom v. Alexander, 414 
F.2d 143, 146 (6th Cir. 1969) (Impleader IS mtended "to aVOid circuity of action and to 
dispose of the entire subject matter ansmg from one set of facts m one action."); J. 
FRmDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIvn. PROCEDURE § 6.9 (1985) (describmg the purpose 
of Rule 14). 
9. See, e.g., Colton v. Swam, 527 F.2d 296 (7th Cir. 1975); LASA, 414 F.2d 143; United 
States v. Acord, 209 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1954); Jones v. Watennan S.S. Corp., 155 F.2d 992 
(3d Cir. 1946). 
10. FED. R. C!v P 13(g); see also Ragland v. Swmdell Dressler Corp., 186 F Supp. 769, 
770 (W.D. Pa. 1960)"(a defendant cannot recover a Judgment agamst a co-defendant except 
by way of a cross-clrum). Once proper, cross-clrums remam so even if the party to whom they 
were addressed subsequently ceases to be a co-party. Frurvlew Park Excavating Co. v. Al 
Monzo Constr. Co., 560 F.2d 1122, 1126 (3d Cir. 1977); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Newton, 398 F.2d 
729, 734 (3d Cir. 1968); Picou v. Rimrock Tidelands, Inc., 29 F.R.D. 188, 189-90 (E.D. La. 
1962); Frommeyer v. L. & R. Constr. Co., 139 F Supp. 579, 586 (D.N.J. 1956); cf. Bell v. 
Owen Thomas, Inc., 115 F.R.D. 299, 301-02 (W.D. Va. 1987) (a cross-clrum was allowed 
when it was filed before the parties were disInlssed, even though leave was not granted until 
after disInlssal). 
11. FED. R. C!v P 14(a). Notably, the provISIons of Rule 13(h) "should not be confused 
with Impleader, which IS governed by Rule 14." 3 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE' 
13.39, at 13-230 (footnote omitted) (2d ed. 1990). 
Thus if A sues X and Y on a clrum, Rule 13(h) does not authonze X to bnng 
m Z, because Z IS or may be liable to rum. That situation IS governed by Rule 
14. On the other hand if X pleads a counterclrum agrunst A, either compulsory 
or permiSSive, or pleads a cross-clrum agrunst Y, then [Rule 13(h)] applies, and 
if the presence of additional parties IS reqUired for the granting of complete relief 
m the determmation of the counterclrum or the cross-clrum, the court should 
order them to be brought m, if Junsdiction of them 'can be obtruned and their 
JOinder will not depnve the court of Junsdiction of the action. 
3 J. MOORE, supra, 1 13.39, at 13-230 to 13-233 (footnotes omitted); see mfra notes 13, 38, 
114 (contrurung additional diSCUSSIOn of Rule 13(h». 
12. ThiS question IS posed m J. FRmDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 8, at § 
6.8, and IS answered m the negative. See also 6 C. WRIGHT, A. Mn.LER & M. KANE, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1431, at 238 (1990) (stating that the rule that "best reflects the 
ongmal mtent of the cross-claim provIsion" was articulated by the court m Murray v. Haverford 
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Under Rule 14(a), a defendant cannot Implead another party unless that 
person is "not a party to the action." 13 Given thIs fact, can the second 
Hosp. Corp., 278 F Supp. 5 (B.D. Pa. 1968». Contra cases cited mfra at note 22; see also 
International Tools (1973), Ltd. v. Arctic Enters., Inc., 75 F.R.D. 70, 73 n.2 (B.D. Mich. 
1977) ("[I]t IS not clear that co-parties withIn the mearung of Rule 13(g) mcil,Ides thIrd-party 
defendants who have been Impleaded by different thIrd-party plamtiffs."); cJ. Hansen v. 
Shearson/Amencan Express, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 246, 250 (B.D. Pa. 1987) (footnote omitted) 
(emphasIs m ongmal) ("Neither the Wnght and Miller treatise nor the case upon whIch it 
relies appears to have contemplated the situation m whIch there IS no other procedural deVIce 
to permit Jomder."). Although Hansen, whIch was deCIded m 1987, stated that the WrIght 
and Miller treatise did not contemplate the situation discussed m thIs Note, the 1990 edition 
of that treatise cited Hansen m a footnote under the' category of "But compare." 6 C. 
WRIGHT, A. Mru.ER & M. KANE, supra, § 1435, at 272 n.3. 
13. FEn. R. Crv. P 14(a). Notably, some courts have held that two ongmal defendants 
can Implead the same thIrd-party defendant under Rule 14(a) on the grounds that the thIrd-
party defendant IS not a party to the ongmal action, but only a party to the thIrd-party 
action. See, e.g., Ruston Gas Turbmes, Inc. v. Pan Am. World AIrways, Inc., No. 81-5345 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 1984) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (citing Atlantic AVIation Corp. v. 
Estate of Costas, 332 F Supp. 1002, 1007 (B.D.N.Y. 1971»; Malaspma v. Farah Mfg. Co., 
21 Fed. R. Servo 2d (Callaghan) 129, 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Novak v. Tigaru, 49 Del. 106, 
109-10, 110 A.2d 298, 299 (Super. Ct. 1954) (applymg DEL. R. Crv P 14(a» (The phrase 
"party to the action" m a Supenor Court Rule, whIch prOVIdes that a defendant may move 
for leave as a thIrd-party plamtiff to serve process and a complamt on a person not a "party 
to the action" who IS or may be liable to hIm for all or part of the plamtiff's claIm agaInst 
hIm, means a party to the ongmal action only, and therefore the fIrst defendant could Implead, 
as thIrd-party defendants, partners, who had already been Impleaded as tlurd-party defendants 
by the second defendant.); see also Stotsky v. Gemng Indus., Inc., 540 N.Y.S.2d 401 (Sup. 
Ct. 1988) (applymg New York law) (A thIrd-party defendant was not a "party" withIn the 
mearung of a discovery statute where the plaIntiff never asserted any claIm agaInst the thIrd-
party defendant.). 
ThIs statutory construction makes little sense because Rule 14(a) does not distinguIsh between 
"ongmal" and "thIrd-party" actions. FED. R. Crv. P 14(a). Although Rule 13(g) states that 
a cross-claIm must relate to "the transaction or occurrence that IS the subject matter either of 
the ongmal action or of a counterclaIm therem or relating to any property that IS the subject 
matter of the ongmal action," FED. R. Crv P 13(g), the "ongmal action" language of Rule 
13(g) cannot be read to prohibit cross-claIms between ongmal defendants and thIrd-party 
defendants because claIms between such parties often mvolve claImS related to the subject 
matter of the ongmal action. Even if the word "ongmal" IS read mto Rule 14(a)'s "not a 
party to the action" language, a claIm still could not be asserted by a thIrd-party defendant 
agaInst an ongmal defendant because an ongmal defendant IS undoubtedly a party to the 
action. 
Notably, the words "ongmal action" do appear m Federal Rule 13(h). Rule 13(h), WhICh IS 
gIven the heading "Jomder of Additional Parties," prOVIdes: "Persons other than those made 
parties to the ongmal action may be made parties to a counterclaIm or cross-claIm m accordance 
with the prOVISIons of Rules 19 and 20." FED. R. Crv P 13(h). According to the Wnght and 
Miller treatise, when a defendant 
WIshes to mterpose a claIm agaInst both a codefendant and a thIrd person not 
yet a partY to the action, the correct procedure IS to cross-claIm agaInst the 
exIsting codefendant under Rule 13(g), and to brIng m the thIrd person as a 
party defendant to the cross-claIm under the procedure for JOlrung additional 
parties m Rule 13(h). If the claIm agaInst the party to be added qualifIes under 
Rule 14(a), however, that party also may be brought m by a thIrd-party action. 
6 C. WRIGHT, A. Mru.ER & M. KANE, supra note 12, § 1431, at 239 (footnote omitted). 
Although the Hansen court used Rule 13(h) to allow a claIm between an ongmal defendant 
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defendant assert any claIm whatsoever agamst the supplier without havmg 
to file a separate summons and complamt? ObVIously, the second defendant 
cannot assert a counterclaIm agamst the supplier pursuant to Rule 13(a) or 
Rule 13 (b) , because the supplier IS not yet an opposmg party 14 Havmg 
already ruled out the possibility of a Rule 14(a) claIm, the second defendant's 
only hope must lie with Rule 13 (g) , goverrung cross-claIms}S Under Rule 
and a third-party defendant, see supra note 38, the heading and language of Rule 13(h) seems 
to prohibit that use of Rule 13(h). See also 6 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 
12, § 1435, at 272 (footnote omitted) (quoting FED. R. CIv P:·13(h»: 
Rule 13(h) explicitly authonzes only the jomder of "persons other than those 
made parties to the orlgmal action." As a result of thiS restnction, a person 
cannot be made an additional party under Rule 13(h) if he already IS a party to 
the action. Rather, the party seekmg relief may proceed directly agamst someone 
who IS already before the court by usmg whatever procedural deVice IS appro-
prlate-counterclrum or cross-clrum-depending on the alignment of the parties. 
But see 3 1. MOORE, supra note 11, 1 13.39, at 13-229 & n.2. In the text, Moore asserts: 
[Rule 13(h») was amended m 1966 to clarify the mtent to mclude both compulsory 
and penmsslve jomder and to make specific reference to Rules 19 and 20. The 
1966 amendment also makes clear that additional parties plazntiff to the coun-
terclrum or cross-clrum, as well as additional parties defendant, may be jomed, 
if jomed m accordance with the procedure and reqUirements of Rules 20 and 19. 
[d. 1 13.39, at 13-229 (emphasIs m orlgmal) (footnotes omitted). To support tlus assertion, 
Moore relies on the 1966 AdVISOry Committee note to Rule 13(h), which he cites m part m a 
footnote. [d. 1 13.39, at 13-229 n.2. The relevant portion of the AdVISOry Committee note 
provides: 
Hereafter, for the purpose of determmmg who must or may be jomed as 
additional parties to a counterclaim or cross-clrum, the party pleading the clrum 
IS to be regarded as a plruntiff and the additional parties as plruntiffs or defendants 
as the case may be, and amended Rules 19 and 20 are to be applied m the usual 
fasluon. 
FED. R. CIv P 13 adVISOry committee's note. For additional diSCUSSion regarding Rule 13(h), 
see supra note 11 and mfra notes 38 and 114. 
Because Rule 13(h) was probably not mtended to govern the scenario discussed m thiS Note, 
courts need to pay special attention to the mandate of Rule 1 m construmg Rules 13(g) and 
14(a). Cj. Winchell v. Lortscher, 377 F.2d 247, 252-53 (8th Cir. 1967) (The word "party," as 
used witlun the meanmg of Federal Rule 73(a), IS "a legal term and a word of art which must 
be VIewed m the context of the rule m which it appears as well as m the context of the other 
relevant Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."). Furthermore, even if one accepts Moore's premise 
that Rule 13(h) authOrizes the kmd of clrums discussed m thiS Note, It IS not entirely clear 
that tlus route IS preferable. For, "[a)lthough not reqUired by Rule 13(h). the general practice 
IS to obtrun a court order to jom an additional party." 6 C. WRIGHT, A/MILLER & M. KANE, 
supra note 12, § 1434, at 270. Compare Id. with 3 J. MOORE, supra note 11, 1 13.39, at 13-
239 ("Under the 1966 revIsion of Rule 13(h), it IS not clear whether leave of the court must 
be obtruned before a defendant can bring m new parties as additional defendants to a 
counterclrum."). The mere possibility of an additional procedural step runs contrary to the 
SPirit of Rule 1, which mandates the "just, speedy, and mexpenslve determmation of every 
action." FED. R. Cry P 1. 
14. FED. R. CIv P 13(a)-(b). 
15. Two of the Federal Rules establish the baSIS for cross-clrums. Rule 13(g) governs cross-
clrums that grow out of the transaction or occurrence that IS the subject matter of the original 
clrum or of a counterclaIm where the cross-claImant IS a plamtiff. WEST'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 
MANuAL § 7985 (West SUpp. 1989). Rule 18(a) applies if the cross-clrum does not grow out 
of such transaction or occurrence. In a Rule 13(g) cross-claIm, subject matter JUrisdiction may 
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13(g), however, cross-chums only can be asserted against "co-parties."16 
Therefore, whether the second defendant will be able to clrum agrunst the .,. 
supplier ultimately will depend on the definition given the term "co-party." 
If "co-party" encompasses the relatIOnshIp between the second defendant 
and the supplier, a cross-clrum can be asserted and the litigation can proceed 
without mterruption. On the other hand, if that relationshIp IS not a subset 
of "co-party," then the second defendant will have to file a separate 
complrunt agrunst the supplier. Although the second defendant can move 
to consolidate the proceedings under Rule 42(a),17 thIs procedure will carry 
with it added expense and delay The movant will have to spend time and 
resources arguing a motion for consolidation, and the separate complrunt 
will reqUIre the payment of an extra filing fee. IS 
The definition gIven the term "co-party" has real consequences for the 
litigation process. Part I of thIS Note discusses how courts have defined 
that term and hIghlights the relevant language of the Federal Rules. Part 
II explores eXIsting authority to clarify the present state of the law. Part 
III focuses on the mtent of the framers of the Federal Rules, and Part IV 
explores the relevant policy consIderations connected to thIs Issue. Finally, 
Part V of thIS Note proposes that the term "co-party" be defined explicitly 
under the Federal Rules. While the Note suggests that the term "co-party" 
can be defined legitimately under eXIsting authority to allow cross-clrums 
• be ancillary whereas Independent subject matter Junsdiction IS reqUIred under Rule 18(a). ld. 
Rule 18(a) prOVIdes: "A party asserting a chum to relief as an ongtnal clrum, counterclrum, 
cross-clrum, or thIrd-party clrum, may JOin, either as Independent or as alternate clrums, as 
many clrums, legal, equitable, or maritime, as the party has agrunst an opposing party." FED. 
R. CIV P 18(a). 
16. FED. R. CIV. P 13(g). "[Clare must be taken not to confuse the procedures and 
purposes of Rule 13(g), whIch are directed toward parties already In the action, with those of 
Rule 14(a), whIch prOVIde for adding one or more thIrd parties to the suit." 6 C. WRIGHT, 
A. Mn.lER & M. KANE, supra note 12, § 1431, at 238. 
17. Rule 42(a) prOVIdes: 
When actions involVIng a common question of law or fact are pending before 
the court, it may order a JOint hearing or tnal of any or all the matters In Issue 
In the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such 
orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to aVOId unnecessary costs or 
delay. 
FED. R. CIV. P 42(a); see also Doble~ The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 VA. L. REv. 
261, 283 (1939) (the author was a member of the AdVISOry Committee appointed to draft the 
Federal Rules) ("An exceedingly WIde discretion IS gIven to the court to consolidate separate 
actions pending before the court when these Involve 'a common question of law or fact[.]"'). 
See generally 9 C. WRIGHT & A. Mn.tER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 2381-86, at 
252-76 (1971) (describing Rule 42(a) In greater detail). 
18. Currently, it costs $120.00 to file a complrunt In federal court. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1914(a) 
(West Supp. 1990). Also, although one court sarcastically noted that the resolution of thIS 
"burrung Issue" may be of "greater Interest to lawyers and the academIC community than to 
litigants," Capital Care Corp. v. Lifetime Corp., No. 88·2682 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 10, 1990) 
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file), it IS litigants who ultimately will bear theIr attorneys' 
expe.nses for extra procedural difficulty. 
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between ongmal defendants and tlurd-party defendants, it urges that the 
Federal Rules be amended to clear up potential confusIon. 
1. BACKGROUND 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(g) provIdes that "[a] pleading may 
state as a cross-claIm any claIm by one party agaInst a co-party that 
IS the subject matter either of the ongmal actIon or of a counterclaIm 
therem or relatmg to any property that IS the subject matter of the ongInal 
action."19 Under eXIsting precedent, courts disagree whether Rule 13(g) 
19. FED. R. CN P 13 (g). Several states have cross-chum rules winch also contam the 
"co-party" language. See ALA. R. Crv P 13(g); A.usKA R. CN P 13(g); ARIz. R. Crv P 
13(g); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-61-207(3) (1990); COLO. R. Crv P 13(g); DEL. R. Crv P 13 (g); 
FLA. R. Crv P 1.170(g); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-13(g) (1989); HAw REv STAT. § 663-l7(b) 
(1989); IDAHO R. Crv P 13(g); IND. TluAL R. 13 (G); IOWA R. Crv P 33; KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 60-213(g)-(h) (1988); Ky. R. CN P 13.07; LA. CODE Crv PROC. ANN. art. 1071 (West 
1986); ME. R. CN P 13(g); MD. R. Crv P 3-331(b); MAss. R. Crv P 13(g); MICH. R. Crv. 
P 2.203(0); MINN. R. CN P 13.07; Mo. REv STAT. § 509.460 (1989); MONT. R. Crv. P 
13 (g); NEB. REv STAT. § 25-813 (1989); NEV R. Crv P 13(g); N.J. R. Crv P 4:7-5(a); 
N.M. R. Crv P 13(G); N.C. GEN. STAT. § lA-I, Rule 13 (g); N.D. R. Crv P 13(g); Omo 
R. Crv P 13(G); R.I. R. Crv P 13(g); S.C. R. Crv P 13(g); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 
15-6-13(g) (1984); TENN. R. Crv P 13.07; TEX. R. Crv P 97(e); UTAH R. Crv P 13(1); VT. 
R. CN P 13 (g); WASH. R. CN P 13 (g); W VA. R. Crv P 13(g); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
802.07(3) (West Supp. 1989); Wyo. R. Crv P 13 (g). 
Other states do not use the term "co-party" m their cross-claIm rules. See, e.g., CAL. Crv. 
PROC. CODE § 428.10 (West 1990) ("A party agaInst whom a cause of action has been asserted 
m a complaInt or cross-complaInt may file a cross-complaInt setting forth [a]ny cause of 
action he has agaInst a person alleged to be liable thereon[.]"); N.Y. Crv PRAC. L. & R. 
3019 (McKinney 1974) ("A cross-claIm may be any cause of action m favor of one or more 
defendants or a person whom a defendant represents agaInst one or more defendants, a person 
whom a defendant represents or a defendant and other persons alleged to be liable."); OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2013(G) (West Supp. 1991) ("A pleading may state as a cross-claIm any 
claIm by one party agamst any party who IS not an opposmg party "); OR. R. Crv P 
22B.(1) ("In any action where two or more parties are jomed as defendants, any defendant 
may m such defendant's answer allege a cross-claIm agaInst any other defendant. A cross-
claIm asserted agaInst a codefendant must be one eXIsting m favor of the defendant asserting 
the" cross-claim and agamst another defendant[.]"); VA. R. Crv P 3:9 ("A defendant may 
plead as a cross-claIm any cause of action that he has or may have agaInst one or more 
other defendants growmg out of any matter pleaded m the motion for judgment."). 
In addition, the "co-party" language can be found m at least one federal statute: 
The provISIons of thiS section shall not prevent the assertion, m an action agaInst 
the United States or an officer or agency thereof, of any claIm of the United 
States or an officer or agency thereof agaInst an opposmg party, a co-party, or 
a third-party that anses out of the transaction or occurrence that IS the subject 
matter of the opposmg party's claIm. 
28 U.S.C.A. § 2415(1) (West 1978) (emphasis added). 
For a history of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13, see 3 J. MOORE, supra note 11, 
, 13.01, at 13-7 to 13-12. See also Doble, supra note 17, at 267 (the author was a member of 
the AdVISOry Committee appomted to draft the Federal Rules) ("Rule 13 makes generous and 
liberal provISIons as to counterclaims and cross-claIms, with the Idea of settling m a smgle 
Civil action the vanous claims of the parties."). For a general diSCUSSIOn of the development 
of the Federal Rules, see Subnn, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure In HistOrical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV 909 (1987). 
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allows cross-clrums between ongmal defendants and th1rd-party defendants.20 
Some courts have interpreted "co-party" to mean part1es haVing like status,21 
thereby precluding the use of cross-clrums under such C1rcumstances. Other 
courts have mterpreted "co-party" broadly, allowmg cross-clrums agrunst 
any party that 1S not an opposmg party.22 Yet another court has suggested 
that "co-parties" are those parties on the same s1de of the mrun litigation.23 
20. The definition of the term "co-party" IS controversial enough for BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990) to list two different mearungs. Id. at 335. Compare F JAMES & 
G. HAzARD, Crvrr. PROCEDURE § 9.12 (3d ed. 1985) (defirung co-parties as those parties 
"aligned together as codefendants or coplaIntiffs") with ld. at § 9.13 (footnote omitted) 
(defirung a co-party as "one who IS already subject to the court's junsdiction"). While the 
hypothetical situation posed In the Introduction to this Note Involved an ongInal defendant 
attempting to cross-claIm agaInst a thIrd-party defendant, the opposite scenano IS also possible. 
For example, a third-party defendant xrught want to me a cross-claIm agaInst a co-defendant 
of the third-party plaIntiff based on a contribution or Indemnification theory. See, e.g., 
Amencan Gen. v. Equitable Gen., 87 F.R.D. 736, 737 (B.D. Va. 1980) (the third-party 
defendant sought to cross-claIm agaInst co-defendants of the thIrd-party plaIntiff for rescIssion 
of an Insurance policy and restitution of prexruums paId). 
21. See, e.g., Hansen v. ShearsoniAmencan Express, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 246 (B.D. Pa. 
1987); Murray v. Haverford Hosp. Corp., 278 F SUpp. 5 (B.D. Pa. 1968); Ruston Gas 
Turbines, Inc. v. Pan Am. World AIrways, Inc., No. 81-5345 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 1984) (LEXIS, 
Genfed library, Dist me); Johnson Controls, Inc .. v. Rowland TompkinS Corp., 585 F Supp. 
969, 974 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (citing Johnson Controls, No. 82-122 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 1983) 
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file». 
22. See, e.g., Georgia Ports Auth. v. ConstruZioru Meccaruche Industnali Genovesi, S.P.A., 
119 F.R.D. 693 (S.D. Ga. 1988); cf. Fogel v. United Gas Improvement Co., 32 F.R.D. 202 
(B.D. Pa. 1963); Capital Care Corp. v. Lifetime Corp., No. 88-2682 (B.D. Pa. Jan. 10, 1990) 
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). 
23. Stahl v. OhIo River Co., 424 F.2d 52, 55 (3d Cir. 1970); see also In re Queeny/ 
Connthos, 503 F SUpp. 361, 364 (B.D. Pa. 1980) (adopting the Stahl definition of "co-
party"); AAA EqUipment & Rental, Inc. v. Bailey, 384 So. 2d 107, 109 (Ala. 1980) (applYing 
ALA. R. Crv. P 13(g» ("Co-parties occupy the same Side In the pnnclpal, or InitiaJ., 
litigation."); Smith v. Lone Star Cadillac, Inc., 470 S.W.2d 791,792 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971) 
(applyIng Texas law) (adopting the Stahl definition of "co-party"); Bunge v. Yager, 236 Minn. 
245, 254, 52 N.W.2d 446, 451 (1952) (applYing MINN. R. Crv P 13.07) (suggesting that co-
parties be defined as those parties whIch are "aligned on the same Side of the litigation"); 
United States ex rei. Amencan Asphalt & Sealcoating Co. v. Amencan Centenrual Ins. Co., 
No. 84-4645 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 2, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (adopting the Stahl 
definition of "co-party"). But see Schwab v. Ene Lackawanna R.R. Co., 438 F.2d 62, 66 (3d 
Cir. 1971) (co-parties defined as those parties shanng "like status"). 
As an aside, the ThIrd Circuit, after its Stahl declSlon, later defined co-parties as those 
parties shanng "like status." Schwab, 438 F.2d at 66; see also Hansen, 116 F.R.D. at 248 
(emphasIS In ongInal) ("[Alfter Schwab, the fact two parties are on the same Side of the mam 
litigation IS not dispositive of the question of whether they are 'co-parties' who may, other 
requirements being met, bnng cross-claIms agaInst one another."). For a diSCUSSion of the 
Stahl and Schwab holdings, see Hansen, 116 F.R.D. at 248. See also Capital Care Corp. v. 
Lifetime Corp., No. 88-2682 (B.D. Pa. Jan. 10, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) 
("Third Circuit law on thiS subject IS properly charactenzed as unsettled."). 
Notably, one court appears to have adopted a hybnd form of the Murray and Stahl 
definitions of "co-party." In re Queeny/Connthos, 503 F SUpp. at 364 ("The Queeny Interests 
and the products defendants are Indeed co-parties shanng a like status on the same Side of 
thiS litigation."). Yet another court has stated that Rule 13(g} "does not permit a cross claim 
agaInst one who IS not named as a defendant by the plaintiff at the time the suit IS Instituted." 
State v. Wood, 53 Del. 527, 533, 173 A.2d 327, 330 (1961) (applYing DEL. R. Cxv P 13(g». 
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The Federal Rules do not define the term "co-party" Courts therefore 
must look to the mtent of the framers of the Rules to determme whether 
cross-chums of the type outlined above should be permItted. To date, courts 
generally have exammed the hIstory of Rules 13(g) and 14(a), and the policy 
consIderations behmd the Federal Rules. Rule 14(a) prOVIdes, among other 
thmgs, that a thIrd-party defendant "shall make any defenses to the thIrd-
party plamtiff's claIm as provIded m Rule 12 and any counterclaims agaInst 
the thIrd-party plaIntiff and cross-claIms agamst other thud-party defen-
dants, as prOVided m Rule 13."24 According to one court, at least, the 
language of Rule 14(a) "amply mdicates the clear mtent of the framers of 
the Federal Rules to charactenze co-parties as parties havmg like status."25 
Under thiS authority, cross-claIms cannot be asserted between ongmal 
defendants and third-party defendants. Other courts, usmg the policy con-
Siderations of Rule 126 as their gUide, favor allowmg cross-claIms between 
ongmal defendants and thIrd-party defendants,2' while finding authority 
weak or lackmg as to whether the framers of the Rules mtended such cross-
claIms to be available.28 
II. EXISTING COMMON LAW AUTHORITY 
A. Murray and Hansen: Case Law Dlsallowmg Cross-Claims 
Between Ongmal Defendants and Third-Party Defendants 
According to one line of precedent, cross-claIms may be asserted only 
between parties with the same or like status, such as co-defendants.29 In 
24. FED. R. Cry P 14(a). For a history of Rule 14, see 3 J. MOORE, supra note 11, 
, 14.01-14.02, at 14-5 to 14-20. 
25. Murray, 278 F Supp. at 7 
26. Rule 1 prOVides that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "shall be construed to secure 
the Just, speedy, and mexpenslve determmation of every action." FED. R. Cry P 1. 
27 See, e.g., Amerzcan Gen., 87 F.R.D. at 737 
28. [d. at 738. 
29. See, e.g., Schwab v. Ene Lackawanna R.R. Co., 438 F.2d 62, 65-66 (3d Cir. 1971); 
Paur v. Crookston Manne, Inc., 83 F.R.D. 466, 472 (D.N.D. 1979); Malaspma v. Farah Mfg. 
Co., 21 Fed. R. Servo 2d (Callaghan) 129, 129 (S.D.N.Y 1975); Land v. Highway Constr. 
Co., 64 Haw. 545, 548, 645 P.2d 295,297 (1982); see also Shafarman V. Ryder Truck Rental, 
Inc., 100 F.R.D. 454, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (citation omitted) ("co-parties are parties at the 
same level"). But cf. Travelers Ins. Co. v. First Nat'r Bank, 675 F.2d 633, 636 n.4 (5th Cir. 
1982) (citation omitted) ("Because the competmg claimants m an mterpleader action are 
nommally all defendants, chums asserted by one mterpleader clatmant agatnst \ another are 
conSidered cross-claims."); General Ins. Co. of Am. V. Hercules Constr. Co., 385 F.2d 13 
(8th Cir. 1967) (There, a general contractor brought a diverSity action agamst a subcontractor's 
surety on a performance bond. [d. at 16. Later, the subcontractor mtervened, although the 
general contractor never amended Its complrunt to seek damages agamst the subcontractor 
because thiS would have destroyed diversity. While the surety never attempted to cross-clrum 
agatnst the subcontractor, the court stated m dicta that It could have done so under Rule 
13(g). [d. at 18-19. Because the general contractor never sued both the subcontractor and the 
surety, the subcontractor and the surety were not parties of like status as defined by Murray. 
This IS Significant because the court m Hercules would have allowed such non-Similar parties 
to brmg cross-claims agamst one another pursuant to Rule 13(g).). 
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Murray v. Haverford Hospital Corp.,30 for example, several defendants filed 
what they labelled a "cross clrum" against a person whom the plruntiff had 
not sued.31 The Murray court dismissed the complrunt without prejudice,32 
stating: 
Tlurd-party practice IS specifically provIded for In F.R.C.P 14, whIch 
proVIdes, Inter alia, that the tlurd-patty defendant "shall make hIS 
defenses to the thIrd-party plaIntiff's claIm as proVIded In Rule 12 and 
his counterclaIms agaInst the thIrd-party plaIntiff and cross-clazms against 
other thzrd-party defendants, as provzded In Rule 13." 
The language quoted amply Indicates the clear Intent of the framers 
of the Federal Rules to charactenze co-parties as parties haVIng like 
status. Were the Intent otherwise confUSion would result, as In this case, 
with some defendants servIng third-party complaInts under Rule 14, after 
obtaining leave of court, and other defendants Simply filing cross-claIms 
purportedly under Rule 13 (g) , wluch does not reqUire summons and 
complaInt or, under any circumstances, leave of court to serve notice 
to the plaIntiff upon motion and notice to all parties to the action.33 
In Hansen v Shearson/ Amerzcan Express, Inc.,34 the same federal court 
reaffIrmed the rule it ha!i delineated prevIOusly fu Murray.3s The Hansen 
court pointed out that, "[a]s ongInally drafted, Rule 14(a) prOVIded that 
the thud-party defendant was to bnng counterclrums and cross-clrums agrunst 
'the plaintiff, the thIrd-party plruntiff, or any other party as prOVIded In 
RuIe 13."'36 Noting that RuIe 14(a) was amended In 1946 to prOVIde for 
30. 278 F Supp. 5 (B.D. Pa. 1968). As the Murray case illustrates, some confUSIOn eXIsts 
about the difference between an mdemnity cross-chum between co-defendants and a Rule 14 
lffipleader chum for mdemnity. See Gentry v. WiImmgton Trust Co., 321 F Supp. 1379 (D. 
Del. 1970). "Any errors m nomenclature actually should not be SIgnificant, however, smce 
both Rule 13(g) and Rule 14(a) c1rums come under the ancillary Junsdiction of the court and 
basIcally the same standards apply for determmmg whether to allow theIr assertion." 6 C. 
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 12, § 1407, at 40. For a more complete diSCUSSIon 
of ancillary Junsdiction, see mfra note 70. 
31. Murray, 278 F Supp. at 6. 
32. ld. at 7. The order preserved the defendants' nght to file and serve a tIurd-party 
complrunt m compliance with Rule 14(a). ld .. 
33. ld. at 6-7 (emphasIS m ongmal). But see Capital Care Corp. v. Lifetime Corp., No. 
88-2682 (B.D. Pa. 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (allowmg cross-c1rums by thIrd-
party defendants agrunst ongmal defendants). 
34. 116 F.R.D. 246 (B.D. Pa. 1987). The Hansen case began as'a suit by Elizabeth Hansen 
agrunst the brokerage firm of Shearson/Amencan Express and two of its brokers, C. Joseph 
Manfredo and S. Paul Palmer. ld. at 247. Hansen alleged that the defendants had nushandled 
her securities account. Shears on filed a third-party complrunt agrunst Arthur L. Guptill, the 
plruntiff's brother-m-Iaw, allegmg that Guptill had ratified the allegedly Improper transactions. 
Guptill then filed c1rums, wInch he captioned as "counterclrums and crossclrums," agrunst 
Shearson, Manfredo and A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. In 1984, Hansen resolved her c1rums 
agrunst Shearson, Manfredo and Palmer. LikeWIse, Guptill resolved Ins c1rums agrunst Shearson 
and Edwards m 1985. Thus, the only c1rum remrumng m the case m 1987 when the Hansen 
case was decIded was Guptill's c1rum agrunst Manfredo. ld. "The difficult question posed by 
Manfredo's motion to dismISS IS whether such a c1rum IS proper." ld. at 248 (footnote omitted). 
35.ld. 
36. ld. at 249. 
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"'counterclrums agrunst the thIrd-party plruntiff, and cross-clrums agamst 
other third-party defendants as proVIded In Rule 13'[,]"37 the Hansen court 
held that "a clrum by a thIrd-party defendant agrunst a co-defendant of the 
thIrd-party plruntiff may not properly be charactenzed as a cross-claIm. "38 
37 [d. (emphasIs m ongmal). 
38. [d. The court also concluded that "Guptill's claim agrunst Manfredo IS not properly 
charactenzed as a counterclaim-at least not m its own nght." [d. In the words of the court: 
"Manfredo had filed no clrum agrunst Guptill which would have rendered Guptill an 'opposmg 
party' with the mearung of Rule 13." [d. (citations omitted). However, emphaslzmg that 
Guptill had also brought a clrum agrunst Shears on-the defendant who had brought Guptill 
mto the action-the court held that "the relationship between Guptill's counterclrum agrunst 
Shearson and Guptill's clrum agamst Manfredo IS sufficiently close to permit jomder under 
Rule 20(a}." [d. at 250 (citation omitted). See supra note 34 for a more detailed descnption 
of the facts of Hansen. 
According to the court m Hansen: 
Rule 13(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which mcorporates Rules 19 
and 20 by reference, provides for the jomder of parties to permit full adjudication 
of counterclrums m one proceeding. Under Fed.R.Civ.P 20(a), parties may be 
jomed "if there IS asserted agrunst them any nght to relief m respect of or 
ansmg out of the same transaction, occurrence, or senes of transactions or 
occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all defendants will 
anse m the action." Rule 13(h}, unlike Rule 13 (g) , does not reqUire that the 
clrum agrunst the additional party arise out of the "transaction or occurrence 
that IS the subject matter of the ongmal action or of a counterclrum therem." 
Hansen, 116 F.R.D. at 250 (quoting FED. R. Crv P 20(a}). Stressmg that Rule 13(h) "pertruns 
by its terms only to the jomder of '[p)ersons other than those made parties to the ongmal 
action,''' the Hansen court noted that the Federal Rules "make no express provlSlon for a 
situation, like the one before us, m wInch a counterclrumant seeks to add to hiS counterclrum 
a party who might properly have been jomed under Rule 13(h) but who IS already a party to 
the action." Hansen, 116 F.R.D. at 250 (quoting FED. R. Crv P 13(h». The Hansen court 
pomted out that there are "few deCided cases on tIns question," and further noted that "the 
leading commentators are diVided." Hansen, 116 F.R.D. at 250. As the Hansen court quoted 
directly from the Wnght and Miller treatise: 
"Rule 13(h) explicitly authonzes only the jomder of 'persons other than those 
made parties to the ongmal action.' As a result of tIns restnction, a person 
cannot be made an additional party under Rule 13(h) if he already IS a party to 
the action. Rather, the party seekmg relief may proceed directly agamst someone 
who IS already before the court by usmg wha,tever procedural deVIce IS appro-
pnate-counterclrum or cross-clrum-depending on the alignment of the parties." 
Hansen, 116 F.R.D. at 250 (quoting 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE, § 1435, at 189 (footnote omitted) (1971) (quoting FED. R. Crv P 13(h))). "The 
Moore treatise suggests, however, that one who IS already a party to the underlYIng litigation 
may be treated as an additional party to a counterclrum under Rule 13(h}." Hansen, 116 
F.R.D. at 250 (citing 3 J. MOORE, supra note 11, 1 14.17, at 14-95 to 14-96, m wInch Moore 
approves of the use of Rule 13(h) for a tInrd-party defendant to jom a plruntiff where the 
tInrd-party defendant wants to counterclrum jomtly agrunst the plruntiff and a defendant}. 
Compare 6 C. WRIGHT & A. Mn.LER, supra, § 1435, at 189 and 3 J. MOORE, supra note 11, 
, 13.39, at 13-229 (footnote omitted) (emphasiS m ongmal) ("The 1966 amendment [to Rule 
13(h)) also makes clear that additional parties plamtiff to the counterclrum or cross-clrum, as 
well a~ additional parties defendant, may be jomed, if jomed m accordance with the procedure 
and requirements of Rules 20 and 19."} with G. SHREVE & P RAVEN-HANSEN, UNDERSTANDING 
Cxvn. PROCEDURE § 55, at 221 n.l (1989) ("[W)hile Rule 13(h) mdicates that one may jom a 
party m order to make a counterclrum or cross-clrum, the provISIon makes clear that such 
expansIOn must separately satisfy rules pertrurung to party jomder[.)"}. See also supra notes 
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The court emphasIzed that the amendment to Rule 14(a) was not "specifi-
cally explamed" by the AdVISOry Committee and declared: 
The AdvISOry Committee notes to the 1946 amendment state that changes 
not specifically explaIned were meant to be "verbal or conformIng." It 
would thus appear that, In the VIew of the AdVISOry Committee, the 
specification that the "other part[ies]" agaInst whom a thIrd-party 
defendant might bnng cross-clrums were "other thIrd-party defendants" 
was not VIewed as a substantive change In Rule 14(a).39 
B. Fogel and GeorgIa Ports Authority: Case Law Allowmg 
Cross-Claims Between Onginal Defendants 
and Thlrd-Party Defendants 
Another line of authority supports the assertion of cross-claIms between 
orIgmal defendants and thIrd-party defendants.40 In Fogel v Umted Gas 
Improvement CO.,41 for mstance, the plaIntiff's decedent was killed by a 
gas explOSIon. The plaIntiff sued both the owner of the gas maIn and the 
contractor who was laYing the maIn. The contractor Jomed the engmeerIng 
firm as a thlrd-party defendant. The owner of the gas maIn filed a cross-
claim against the engmeerIng firm for mdemnification m the event that the 
owner should be held liable to the plaIntiff.42 Holding the cross-claIm 
permlssible, the court noted: '''Co' IS a prefix whIch 'SIgnifies m general 
with, together, In conjunction, JOintly.' Even though [the thlrd-party defen-
dant's] position m the case IS somewhat different from the positions of the 
11 & 13 and mfra note 114 (contammg additional diSCUSSIOn of Rule 13(h»; 6 C. WRIGHT, A. 
MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 12, § 1434, at 267-70 (distingulshmg the application and 
purposes of Rule 13(h) from that of Rule 14(a». 
Thus, m the end, despite the unwillingness of the Hansen court to characterIze the claIm at 
ISsue as a "cross-claIm," it ultimately allowed the litigation to proceed without mterruption. 
In addition to citing Rule 1, the court concluded: 
We are of the View that the purpose of Rule 13(h), whIch "is to dispose of an 
action m its entirety and to grant complete relief to all the concerned parties," 
would best be served by resolVing what appears to be an overSight 10 the Rules 
10 favor of permitting one who might properly have been Jomed pursuant to 
Rule 13(h), but who IS already a party to the litigation, to be Jomed 10 the 
adjudication of a pemusslve counterclaIm brought by a thIrd-party defendant. In 
such a situation, we see no purpose m requIrIng the thIrd-party defendant to 
serve process on the party to be Jomed 10 the SaIne manner as would be reqUIred 
had that party not already been a party to the action. 
Hansen, 116 F.R.D. at 250-51 (citatIons omitted) (quoting 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra, 
§ 1434, at 188). 
39. Hansen, 116 F.R.D. at 249. Actually, the AdVISOry Committee's notes to the 1946 
aInendment do not actually state that changes not specifically explaIned were meant to be 
"verbal or confomung." See mfra note 83 for the precise language of the AdVISOry Committee's 
note of 1946. 
40. See cases cited supra note 22. 
41. 32 F.R.D. 202 (E.D. Pa. 1963). 
42. [d. at 203. 
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ongmal defendants, It IS a co-party withm the meanmg of Rule 13(g). "43 
Similarly, m Georgia Ports Authonty v. ConstruZlOm Meccamche Indus-
tnali GenovesI, S.P.A.,44 a federal distnct court reached the same conclu-
slon.45 In Georgia Ports Authority, the plamtiff sued a contractor and its 
surety allegmg breach of contract. The surety then filed a third-party 
complamt agamst the subcontractor responsible for the work at Issue.46 The 
court allowed the contractor to file a subsequent cross-clrum agrunst the 
subcontractor,47 notmg that the cases disallowmg cross-clrums by an.ongmal 
defendant against a third-party defendant had also assumed that the clrum 
could be asserted alternatively as a third-party complrunt under Rule 14(a).48 
Emphaslzmg that a clrum under Rule 14(a) may be asserted only agrunst a 
person not a party to the action,49 the court m Georgia Ports Authority 
rejected the Murray constructIOn of "co-party "SO The court noted that, 
under Murray's mterpretatlOn of "co-party," the contractor's only option 
would be to file an mdependent action agrunst the subcontractor.51 Fur-
thermore, followmg the Murray rule would result m a Catch-22 situation. ~2 
Under Murray, the contractor could not assert a third-party complrunt under 
Rule 14(a) because the subcontractor was a party to the action before the 
contractor lodged its claim agrunst the subcontractor; yet, because the 
subcontractor and the contractor were not "co-parties" as defined under 
Murray, a cross-clrum could not be asserted under Rule 13(g).53 "Co-
defendants [would be] forced to· race to be the first defendant to Implead 
a particular third-party defendant. "54 
The Court cannot accept that such a result was Intended by the Federal 
Rules. The Rules are to "be construed to secure the Just, speedy, and 
InexpenSive determInation of every action." Fed. R. Civ P 1. To 
construe Rule 13(g) as not encompassIng clrums asserted by ongInal 
defendants agrunst third party defendants would force additional, In-
dependent actions to be filed. JOInder would then be proper. ThiS only 
accomplishes the creation of an extra file. Here, where tnal IS only a 
43. Id. at 204 (emphaSIS m ongmal) (quoting WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 510 (2d 
ed. 1948». 
44. 119 F.R.D. 693 (S.D. Ga. 1988). 
45. Id. at 695. 
46. Id. at 694. 
47. Id. at 695. 
48. Id. at 694. Even m cases where cross-clatms were not allowed between ongmal 
defendants and third-party defendants, the attempted clatms were regularly dismissed without 
prejudice. See, e.g., Ruston Gas Turbmes, Inc. v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., No. 81-
5345 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 1, 1984) (LEXlS, Genfed library, Dist file); Paur, 83 F.R.D. at 474; 
Malaspma, 21 Fed. R. Servo 2d (Callaghan) at 130; Murray, 278 F Supp. at 7. 
49. Georgia Ports Auth., 119 F.R.D. at 694. 
50. Id. at 695. 
51. Id. at 694. 
52.Id. 
53. Id. at 694-95. 
54. Id. at 695. 
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few weeks away, delay and duplication of expense could also be accom-
plished." 
561 
Concluding that the term "co-party" witlnn Rule 13(g) lJl.eans "any party 
that is not an opposmg party, "56 the court- m GeorgIa Ports Authority 
criticized the common law opposmg tlns result. The court stated: 
In some of the cases holding that an ongmal defendant may not assert 
a cross-chum agaInst a thIrd-party defendant, it has been suggested that 
such parties are not "co-parties" because they are adverse. Tins concern 
IS absurd: anytime a cross-clrum IS fIled, the parties are necessarily 
adverse (one of the parties IS swng the other!). The very fact that cross-
claIms are allowed contemplates the presence of adversity between cross-
claIm plaIntiffs and cross-clrum defendants, and therefore, between "co-
parties. "57 
C. Amencan General: Case Law Allowzng Cross-Claims 
Between Original Defendants and Third-Party 
Defendants Under Certain Circumstances 
In Amencan General v. Equitable General,58 American General Insurance 
Co. fIled a complamt alleging securities acts VIOlatIons agamst Equitable 
General COl}). and its directors.59 After Gulf Life Insurance Co. was 
substituted by an order of the court as a party defendant m place of 
Equitable General,60 the court granted Gulf Life's motion for leave to bnng 
cross-clrums agamst two of the named directors, Phillips and Eslinger, and 
a tlnrd-party complaint agaInst Contmental Casualty CO.61 The court also 
granted leave for Phillips and Eslinger to bring tlnrd-party complaInts 
agaInst Continental.62 Gulf Life subsequently fIled cross-claims agaInst Phil-
lips and Eslinger and a third-party complaInt against Continental. Phillips 
and Eslinger also fIled a third-party complamt against Continental.63 A 
short time later, Continental fIled answers to Gulf Life's substituted amended 
third-party complaInt, Phillips' fIrst amended third-party complaInt and 
Eslinger's tlnrd-party complaint.64 Continental also fIled counterclauns agaInSt 
Gulf Life, Phillips and Eslinger, and cross-claIms agamst the other named 
directors.65 In its counterclauns and cross-claims, Continental sought resCISSIOn 
55.Id. 
56.Id. 
57. Id. (citations omitted). 
58. 87 F.R.D. 736 (E.D. Va. 1980). 
59. Id. at 736. 
60. Id. at 736 n.l. 
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of a Contmental msurance policy purportedly covermg the named defendants 
and restitutIon of the premmms prud.66 The Issue presented to the court-
by way of a motIon to dismIss brought by the other named directors, 
Willard, Sanders, Boddiger and Chatelrun-was whether Rules 13(g) and 
14(a) permitted the thIrd-party defendant, Contmental, to file cross-clrums 
agrunst co-defendants, the four director-movants, of the thrrd-party plrun-
tiffs, Gulf Life and directors Phillips and Eslinger. 67 
After notmg that no benefit would be gruned by disIDlssmg the cross-
clrums, the Amencan General court held that, absent a showmg of prejudice, 
cross-clrums brought by a thIrd-party defendant agrunst co-defendants of 
the thrrd-party plruntiffs would stand.68 PartIcularly, the court asserted that 
an exammation of the hIstory of Rule 14(a) does not mdicate a clear 
mtention to prohibit the filing of such cross-clrums. Thus, absent some 
showmg of prejudice, the court did not feel "specifically prohibited by Rule 
from permittmg the filing of [such] cross-clrums. "69 Only if the movants 
could show lack of diversity or an mability to obtrun servIce of process, 
for example, would the court have disallowed the cross-clrums brought by 
Continental, the thIrd-party defendant, agrunst the four directors.7o 
66. Id. 
67. Id. at 736. 
68. Id. at 739; see also International Tools (1973), Ltd. v. Arctic Enters., Inc., 75 F.R.D. 
70, 72 n.2 (B.D. Mich. 1977) (allowmg chums asserted by a third-party defendant agamst 
third-party defendants Impleaded by different third-party plamtiffs to stand despite the court's 
statement that "it IS not clear that co-parties withm the mearung of Rule 13(g)" mcludes such 
parties). 
69. AmerIcan Gen., 87 F.R.D. at 738. 
70. Id. According to the AmerIcan General court: 
Permitting a cross-clrum rather than requmng the filing of an ongmal complrunt 
might affect the movants with respect to the Junsdiction of the Court and with 
respect to service of process. A requirement for filing a complrunt m federal 
court IS mdependent federal Junsdiction. ThiS IS not a requirement for the filing 
of a cross-claim, smce it arises out of the same transaction and, therefore, ·IS 
ancillary to the mrun cause of action. Also, the filing of a complrunt requires 
that the plruntiff obtrun service of process over the defendants pursuant to 
Fed.R.Civ.P 4 while the filing of a cross-clrum requires no additional servIce of 
process. Had the movants alleged that there was a lack of complete diversity 
between them and Continental, or that Continental could not have obtruned 
service of process over the movants, the movants clearly would have been 
prejudiced by allowmg the cross-clrums to stand. Under such Circumstances, the 
Court would not have hesitated to grant the motion to dismiSS. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
However, ancillary Junsdiction of cross-clrums between ongmal defendants and third-party 
defendants IS proper-mdeed favored-under the law. According to one source: 
With regard to cross-clrums few Junsdictional problems are encountered. Under 
the federal rules a cross-clrum must relate to the transaction sued on m the 
complrunt. ThiS relationship m turn IS a baSIS of ancillary federal Junsdiction. 
Ordinarily no problem of personal Junsdiction IS presented, for a cross-clrum by 
definition IS agamst a coparty, I.e., one who IS already subject to the court's 
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The American General court was 
decISlons typified by Murray if 
willing to gIve effect to the 
the movant could establish 
Junsdiction. 
F JAMES & G. HAzARD, supra note '20, § 9.13, at 496-97 (footnotes omitted). As another 
source has explained: 
Once the court detenrunes that complete Justice between the parties with respect 
to the onglnal action reqwres the adjudication of the cross·chum, then it IS quite 
lOgical to take the additional step and hold that Junsdiction to entertaIn the 
complrunt Includes the power to consider the cross·clrum, even though Junsdiction 
would not eXist if the clrum were brought as an Independent action. 
6 C. WRIGHT, A. Mu.LER & M. KANE, supra note 12, § 1433, at 256. "[S]ince cross-clrums 
are subject to basically the same transactional test as compulsory counterclaims under Rule 
13(a), the two should be treated sunilarly for Junsdictional purposes." 6 C. WRIGHT, A. 
MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 12, § 1433, at 256 (footnote omitted). . 
In United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 722 (1966), the U.S. Supreme Court was 
faced with the question of whether the federal courts have Junsdiction over a state claim In 
the absence of diversity. The Court held that constitutional power eXiSts to decide a state 
clrum whenever it IS so related to the federal claim that "the entire action before the court 
compnses but one constitutional 'case. '" Id. at 725 (footnote omitted). As part of the test set 
forth In Gibbs, the federal and state clrums must denve from "a common nucleus of operative 
fact." Id., see also G. SHREVE & P RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 38, § 31, at 122-23 (suggesting 
Gibbs has a three-part test for "constitutional case"). In so holding, "the Court expressly 
recogruzed that the view of the drafters of the Federal Rules as to the scope of a lawsuit was 
relevant." 3 J. MOORE, supra note 11, 1 14.26, at 14-118 (citing Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725 n.13); 
see also Goldberg, The Influence of Procedural Rules on Federal JurISdiction, 28 STAN. L. 
REv 395, 418 (1976) (The Gibbs case "acknowledged the extent to whIch the procedural 
poliCies of the new Federal Rules Influenced its deCISIon."). Compare Id., with C. WRIGHT, A. 
Mu.LER & M. KANE, supra note 12, § 1433, at 253-56 (footnote omitted) ("The practice of 
treating cross-claims as part of the court's ancillary Junsdiction came Into eXIstence even pnor 
to the federal rules."). 
Although Gibbs presented a case of pendent Junsdiction rather than ancillary Junsdiction, 
Gibbs emphasized that, "[u]nder the [Federal] Rules, the Impulse .IS toward entertrurung the 
broadest possible scope of action consistent with frurness to the parties; JOinder of claims, 
parties and remedies IS strongly encouraged." Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 724; see also G. SHREVE & 
P RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 38, § 30, at 119-21 (explainIng the difference between pendent 
and ancillary Junsdiction). Indeed, the only major case restnctlng the availability of ancillary 
Junsdiction IS Owen Eqwpment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978). See generally 
Berch, The Erection-of a Bamer Against Assertion of Ancillary Claims: An Examination of 
Owen EqUipment and Erection Company v. Kroger, 1979 ARIz. ST. L.J. 253, 260-62 (suggesting 
that Kroger may be of limited Significance). 
In Kroger, the Supreme Court addressed the question, "In an action In which federal 
Junsdiction IS based on diversity of citizenshIp, may the plruntiff assert a clrum agrunst a thIrd-
party defendant when there IS no Independent basiS for federal JUrIsdiction over that clrum?" 
Kroger, 437 U.S. at 367. DeCiding that a plruntiff may not assert such a clrum, the Court 
started with the assumption that the plruntiff's claims against the nondiverse thIrd-party 
defendant and the plruntiff's claims agrunst the ongInal, diverse defendant arose from a 
"common nucleus of operative fact." Jd. at 371 n.l0. However, the Court held that that was 
suffiCient only to bnng the nondiverse claim withIn the "constitutional limits of federal JudiCial 
power." Id. at 371. It did not necessarily follow, the Court stated, that the nondiverse clrum 
was withIn the statutory grant of federal Junsdiction made by 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(I), as 
expanded by the concept of ancillary JUrIsdiction. Kroger, 437 U.S. at 371-72. "Constitutional 
power IS merely the first hurdle that must be overcome In detenmmng that a federal court 
has Junsdiction over a particular controversy. For the JUrIsdiction of the federal courts IS 
limited also by Acts of Congress." Id. at 372. Holding that the "context" In which a 
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pre]udice,71 but found no such prejudice In that case.72 ASIde from finding 
that the Intent of the framers of the Federal Rules under Rule 13(g) IS 
unclear,?3 thIS case IS sIgnificant for two reasons. First, like the court In 
Georgia Ports Authorzty, the Amerzcan General court adopted Rule 1 as its 
gUlde to the framers' Intent.'4 Second, because Amerzcan General allowed 
arguably Improper cross-clrums to stand,7S the case suggests that litigatlOn 
InvolvIng otherwIse illegItImate cross-claIms between ongInal defendants and 
nondiverse clrum IS asserted IS "crucIal," ld. at 376, the Kroger Court noted two major 
differences between the plruntiff's attempted clrum agrunst the nondiverse thIrd-party defendant 
In its case and those nondiverse clrums routinely held to be withIn a federal court's ancillary 
Junsdiction. First, the plruntiff's proposed clrum agrunst the nondiverse thIrd-party defendant 
was siinply not ancillary to the federal one In the same sense that, for example, 
the Impleader by a defendant of a thIrd-party defendant always IS. A thIrd-party 
complrunt depends at least In part upon the resolution of the pnmary lawsuit. 
Its relation to the original complrunt IS thus not mere factual SImilarity but logIcal 
dependence. 
Id. (citation omitted). Second, it was the plruntiff In Kroger who was attempting to assert the 
nondiverse clrum. Id. 
Id. 
By contrast, ancillary JUrISdiction tYPIcally Involves clrums by a defending party 
haled Into court agaInst hIS will A plruntiff cannot complrun if ancillary 
JUrisdiction does not encompass all of hIS possible clrums In a case such as thIs 
one, since it IS he who has chosen the federal rather than the state forum and 
must thus accept its limitations. -
As many scholars have noted, the U.S. Supreme Court's analysIs of ancillary Junsdiction 
In Kroger explaIns the doctrine's extensIon to cross-clrums under Rule 13(g) and Impleader 
claIms under Rule 14. See, e.g., G. SHREVE & P RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 38, § 32, at 128 
("Each of these kinds of JOInder requIres a transactional nexus under the rules between the 
JOined and the anchor clrum (thUS satisfYIng the common nucleus requirement), and each IS 
Invoked defenSIvely by a defendant or another party who has no practical chOIce of forum. "). 
Since both origInal defendants and thIrd-party defendants are In defenSive legal postures, 
construIng "co-party" to allow claIms between such parties would be conSIStent with Kroger 
and the doctnne of ancillary JUrisdiction. Indeed, as the Supreme Court stated In Kroger, "[i]t 
IS not unreasonable to assume that, In generally requmng complete diversity, Congress did not 
Intend to confine the JUrISdiction of federal courts so Inflexibly that they are unable to protect 
legal rights or effectively to resolve an entire, logIcally entwined lawsuit." Kroger, 437 U.S. 
at 377. 
Thus, American General, by requmng a party to file an Independent action where prejudice 
IS found to eXIst, runs contrary to the trend of federal courts In allOWing the use of ancillary 
JUrISdiction. Moreover, the approach of American General ignores the congresSIOnally approved 
mandate of Rule 1 that the Federal Rules be construed to secure the "just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action." FED. R. Crv P 1; see also Goldberg, supra, at 
442-43 (diSCUSSIng the Interaction of Rule 1 and Rule 82). 
71. American Gen., 87 F.R.D. at 738. 
72. Id. at 739. 
73. Id. at 738. 
74. Id. at 739; see also Capital Care Corp. v. Lifetime Corp., No. 88-2682 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 
10, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) ("[G]iven the encouragement" of Federal Rule 
I, "it does not make sense to Interpret the Rules of Civil Procedure as precluding the thlrd-
party defendant from filing a thIrd-party complrunt agrunst the other (Le., non-thlrd-party 
plruntiff) defendants on the ground that they are already parties to the action, hence not 
covered by Rule 14[.]"). 
75. See Hansen, 116 F.R.D. at 248 n.2. 
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thIrd-party defendants could be allowed to continue without interruption so 
long as the cross-clrums were withm the subject matter of the original action 
and did not prejudice the partIes agrunst whom they were brought.76 In 
other words, if a court finds that an "illegitimate" cross-clrum would have 
been properly consolidated with the ongmal action had the correct procedure 
been followed, a court could exercise its broad equitable powers to allow 
the cross-claim to stand.77 
76. Another approach, adopted by some courts, IS to sever a plaIntiff's claIms agaInst two 
defendants pursuant to Rule 21, so that both defendants can Implead'the same thIrd-party 
defendant under Rule 14(a), See 6 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 12, § 1446, 
at 375; 3 J. MOORE, supra note 11, , 14.14, at 14-84 to 14-87; see also Field v. Volkswagenwerk 
AG, 626 F.2d 293, 298 n.9 (3d Cir. 1980) (citations omitted) ("[M]ost courts that have 
consIdered the problem have resolved it by usmg [Rule] 14(a) m conjunction with theIr broad 
severance powers under Civil Rule 21."); Henz v. Supenor Truckmg Co., 96 F.R.D. 219, 221 
(M.D. Pa. 1982) (the defendant m a personal mJury actIon brought by a husband and wife 
was held entitled to sever the claIms of the husband and wife so that the defendant could 
pursue an action for contribution and mdemnity agaInst the husband as a thIrd-party defen-
dant); SlaVICS v. Wood, 36 F.R.D. 47, 47 (E.D. Pa. 1964).(emphasls In ongInal) (quoting FED. 
R. Crv. P 14(a» ("It IS necessary to resort to Rule 21, because Rule 14 only allows a 
defendant to Jom as a thIrd-party defendant '* * a person not a party to the action '''); 
cf. Campbell v. Meadow Gold Prods. Co., 52 F.R.D. 165, 169 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (when the 
defendant removed a state action to a federal court and sought to counterclaIm for contribution 
agaInst one plaIntiff, the proper procedure would have been severance and Jomder under Rules 
21 and 14(a) respectively). Not only does thIs approach aVOId the problem of defendants 
haVIng to race to be the first to Implead a thIrd-party, but the two proceedings can then be 
consolidated pursuant to Rule 42. 
However, thIs approach seems InCOnSIstent with Rule l's mandate that the Federal Rules be 
construed to secure the "just, speedy, and mexpenSlve determmation of every action." Georgia 
Ports Auth., 119 F.R.D. at 695 n.2. Notably, although thIs severance procedure IS supported 
by a literal reading of Rule 14(a), at least three scholars endorse the approach of a Minnesota 
federal distnct court, whIch allowed Impleader as an mitial matter without gomg through the 
ritual of severance followed by Impleader and Jomder, to aVOId thIs cumbersome procedure. 
6 C. WRIGHT, A. Mn.LER & M. KANE, supra note 12, § 1446, at 376 & n.30 (citIng United 
States ex rei. Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Nicholas, 28 F.R.D. 8, 10-11 (D. Minn. 
1961»; see also Novak v. Tigaru, 49 Del. 106, 109, 110 A.2d 298, 299 (Super. Ct. 1954) 
(applymg DEL. R. Crv. P 14(a» (citation omitted) (the court was "unwilling to conclude that 
the authors of Civil Rule 14, and of Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, from 
WhICh our Rule was taken, mtended the CIrCUItous and awkward method of severance, thlrd-
party action and consolidation"). 
77. Courts have used analogous theones to keep claIms alive In cases where a pleading 
Improperly desIgnated a defense as a counterclaIm or a counterclrum as a defense, or m cases 
where counterclaIms or cross-clalms have been mIslabelled. See 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1275, at 457-60 (1990); 6 C. WRIGHT, A. MnLER & M. 
KANE, supra note 12, § 1407, at 39-40; see also FED. R. Crv. P 8(c) ("When a party has 
mIstakenly desIgnated a defense as a counterclaIm or a counterclaIm as a defense, the court 
on terms, if Justice so reqUIres, shall treat the pleading as if there had been a proper 
desIgnation."); Kwong v. OCCIdental Life Ins. Co., 273 F.2d 691, 693 n.2 (5th Cir. 1960) (a 
"cross-claIm" filed by defendants agaInst an msurer would be treated as a compulsory 
counterclaIm); Sachs v. Sachs, 265 F.2d 31, 33 (3d Cir. 1959) (where a wife's prayer for 
support payments appeared under the heading of a separate defense m her husband's divorce 
action, the tnal court properly treated the request as a counterclaIm); United States v. Summ, 
282 F Supp. 628, 631 (D.N.J. 1968) (a defendant's counterclaIm could be treated as claIm 
for recoupment); Falclam v. PhiladelphIa Transp. Co., 189 F Supp. 203, 204 (E.D. Pa. 1960) 
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III. THE INTENT OF THE FRAMERS OF THE FEDERAL RULES 
In Murray, the court declared that the language of Rule 14(a) amply 
mdicates the clear mtent of the framers to prohibit cross-chums by ongInal 
defendants agaInst tlurd-party defendants.78 Similarly, the Hansen court held 
that cross-claIms could not be asserted by thIrd-party defendants agaInst 
co-defendants of thIrd-party plaIntiffs.79 Both these rulings rely on an 
amendment to Rule 14(a) that was never explamed by the AdVISOry Com-
mittee.8o Before thIS 1946 amendment, a thIrd-party defendant under Rule 
14(a) was to bnng counterclaIms and cross-claIms agaInst "the plaIntiff, the 
thIrd-party plaIntiff, or any other party as provIded m Rule 13."81 After 
the amendment, counterclaIms were to be brought agaInst the plaIntiff and 
the thrrd-party plaIntiff, and cross-claIms were to be brought "agaInst other 
thIrd-party defendants as provIded m Rule 13."82 Relymg on the silence of 
the AdVIsory Committee notes to the 1946 amendment on thIs pomt and 
the statement that changes that were not specifically explaIned were meant 
to be "verbal or conformmg,"83 the Hansen court concluded that the 
AdVIsory Committee mtended no substantIve change to Rule 14(a) when 
"other part[ies]" was amended to read "other thIrd-party defendants."84 
In short, the court concluded that, pnor to the 1946 amendment, ongmal 
defendants had not been mcluded among "other part[ies]" agaInst whom 
a thIrd-party defendant could brmg cross-claIms. 
(a bus owner ffi1ght assert a clrum against an automobile dnver for drunage to a bus regardless 
of whether the clrum was called a counterclrum or a cross-clrum). 
Furthermore, one court has noted that, even if "co-party" IS defined so that cross-clrums 
are only allowed between parties of exactly SImilar status, any techrucal objection to an 
"improper" cross-clrum would be wruved if a party delayed In asserting it. Georgia Ports 
Auth., 119 F.R.D. at 695 n.2. 
78. Murray v. Haverford Hosp. Corp., 278 F Supp. 5, 7 (B.D. Pa. 1968). But see Hansen 
v. Shearson/ Amencan Express, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 246, 248 (B.D. Pa. 1987) ("The mearung of 
the term 'co-party' IS not self-eVIdent, even with [the] Interpretive gloss placed on it by the 
court In Murray. "). 
79. Hansen, 116 F.R.D. at 249. 
80. See mfra note 83 for the precIse language of the AdVISOry Committee's note of 1946 
to Rule 14. 
81. Fed. R. Civ. P 14{a), 28 U.S.C. (1941). 
82. FED. R. Crv P 14{a). 
83. Contrary to the Hansen court's suggestion, the AdVISOry Committee's note of 1946 
does not contain the exact "verbal or conforffi1ng" language. Tlus language appears to come 
from a scholar's Interpretation of the hIstory of Rule 14{a). Although the 1990 edition of 
Moore's Federal Practice no longer contains such a reference, the language does appear In 
that treatIse as late as the 1989 edition. 3 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, , 14.01[1], 
at 14-8 (2d ed. 1989) ("Other changes were verbal or conforming."). The AdVISOry Committee's 
note of 1946 to Rule 14 actually reads: "The elimination of the words 'the thIrd-party plruntiff, 
or any other party' from the second sentence of Rule 14{a), together with the Insertion of the 
new phrases therein, are not changes of substance but are merely for the purpose of 
clarification." FED. R. Crv P 14 adVISOry committee's note. 
84. Hansen, 116 F.R.D. at 249. 
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However, by focusmg solely on an unexplamed amendment to Rule 14(a), 
the Hansen court may have mterpreted mcorrectly the term "co-party" 
First, tlus approach SImply Ignores the fact that the Rules contam no explicit 
definition of "co-party." While courts must give meanmg to thIS word, 
logic-hardly compels that a term found only m Rule 13(g) should be defined 
solely on the basIs of an unexplamed change to a different rule.85 
Second, the unexplamed amendment to Rule 14(a) IS open to more than 
one reasonable mterpretation. While the Hansen conclUSIOn IS certrunly a 
possibility, the unexplruned change may have also manifested the mtent of 
the framers of the Federal Rules to allow such cross-clrums. The framers 
may have replaced "any other party" with "other third-party defendants" 
SImply to elimmate superfluous words.86 It IS possible that the framers of 
the Rules recognIZed that Rule 13(g)'s use of the term "co-party" already 
embraced the orIginal defendant/thIrd-party defendant relationshIp and that 
therefore any language authorIzmg such claims m Rule 14(a) was unneces-
sary.87 Arguably, the lack of any explicit AdVISOry Committee explanatIOn 
85. Where the literal reading of a statutory term would "compel an odd result," Green v. 
Bock Laundry Machme Co., 109 S. Ct. 1981, 1984 (1989), the Supreme Court has held that 
it "must search for other eVidence of congressional mtent to lend the term its proper scope." 
Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 109 S. Ct. 2558, 2566 (1989) (citations 
omitted). '''The Circumstances of the enactment of particular legislation,' for example, 'may 
persuade.a court that Congress did not mtend words of common meamng to have. their literal 
effect.'" Id. (quoting Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266 (1981». 
Even though, as Judge Learned Hand said, "the words used, even m their literal 
sense, are the prImary, and ordinarily the most reliable, source of mterpreting 
the meamng of any writing," nevertheless "it IS one of. the surest mdexes of a 
mature and developed JUrIsprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; 
but to remember that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish, 
whose sympathetic and Imagmative discovery IS the surest gUide to their meamng." 
Public Citizen, 109 S. Ct. at 2566 (quoting Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir.), 
a/I'd, 326 U.S. 404 (1945). 
Lookmg beyond the naked text for gUidance IS perfectly proper when the result 
it apparently decrees IS difficult to fathom or where it seems mconslstent with 
Congress' mtention, smce the plam-meamng rule IS "rather an axiom of experIence 
than a rule of law, and does not preclude conSideration of persuasive eVidence 
if it eXists." 
Public Citizen, 109 S. Ct. at 2566 (citation omitted) (quoting Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. 
United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928». Compare Alemikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 
87 MICH. L. REv 20, 22-46 (discussmg textualism versus mtentionalism) with Murphy, Old 
Maxllns Never Die: The "Plam-Meamng Rule" and Statutory Interpretation m the "Modern" 
Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REv 1299 (1975). 
86. The AdVISOry Committee's notes appear to confirm thiS reading. See supra note 83. 
87. Cj. Capital Care Corp. v. Lifetime Corp., No. 88-2682 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 10, 1990) 
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file): 
The problem IS that F.R.Civ.P 14 permits third-party defendants to file "any 
counterclaIms agaInst the third-party plaIntiff and cross-claIms agamst other thlrd-
party defendants as prOVided m Rule 13" and prOVides that the third-party 
defendant "may also assert any claIm agaInst the plamtiff arIsmg out of the 
transaction or occurrence " The same rule also prOVides: "A third-party 
defendant may proceed under thiS rule agamst any person not a party to the 
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cuts m favor of thIS mterpretation. One would assume that the AdvIsory 
Committee would have felt compelled to elucIdate the reason for the 
change-from the broader language of "any other party" to the seemmgly 
more restnctIve language of "other thud-party defendants" -if It were 
mtended to be substantIve. The lack of such an explanatIOn suggests that 
the AdvISOry Committee did not mtend to restnct the availability of cross-
clrums between ongmal defendants and thIrd-party defendants whatsoever. 88 
Even assummg that the AdvISOry Committee notes lean m favor of 
forbIdding cross-clrums between ongmal defendants and thIrd-party defen-
dants, that conclusIOn IS not dispositIve. The United States Supreme Court 
has srud that the Committee's notes should be gIven weIght m determmmg 
the validity, meanmg or consistency of the Federal Rules but that they are 
not bmding authority 89 Furthermore, reliance solely upon either Rule 14(a) 
or the CommIttee notes would m some mstances-notably thIS one-conflict 
with the mandate of Rule 1. 
Rule 1 requires that the Federal Rules be "construed to secure the Just, 
speedy, and mexpenslve determmatIOn of every actIon."9O The courts have 
applied Rule 1 broadly to many procedural questIons under many different 
rules.91 In Herbert v Lando,92 for example, the Supreme Court held that 
Rule 26 must be construed subject to the decree of Rule l.93 Likewise, m 
action who IS or may be liable to the third-party defendant for all or part of the 
claim made In the action against the third-party defendant." 
Thus, a claim by a third-party defendant agamst someone who IS not a plamtiff, 
a third-party plaintiff, or a non-party to the action, IS not authonzed by Rule 
14. 
88. Another explanation IS that the AdvIsory Committee Simply overlooked the effect of 
the Rule 14(a) amendment on the Federal Rules. See, e.g., Capital Care Corp. v. Lifetime 
Corp., No. 88-2682 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 10, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (clung Hansen, 
116 F.R.D. at 251). 
89. MissIssIPPI Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444 (1946); see also C. J. 
Wieland & Son Dairy Prods. Co. v. Wickard, 4 F.R.D. 250, 252 (E.D. Wis. 1945) (the 
Advisory Committee's notes are persuasive but cannot be accepted as authority). 
90. FED. R. Cry P 1. 
91. See, e.g., Nasser v. Isthmian Lines, 331 F.2d 124, 127 (2d Cir. 1964) (The Federal 
Rules "were mtended to embody a umtary concept of efficient and ·meamngful JudiCial 
procedure, and no smgle Rule can consequently be conSidered m a vacuum."); Camster 
Co. v. Leahy, 182 F.2d 510, 514 (3d Cir. 1950) (The Rules "must be conSidered In relation 
to one another."); National Bondholders Corp. v. McClintic, 99 F.2d 595, 599 (4th Cir. 1938) 
(The procedure under Rule 26 of these Rules "is entitled to be liberally construed In accordance 
with" Rule 1.); Umted States v. Pinto, 44 F.R.D. 357, 359 (W.D. Mich. 1968) (The Federal 
Rules "are to be mterpreted m light of Rule I."); United States v. Purdome, 30 F.R.D. 338, 
339 (W.D. Mo. 1962) ("Each separate rule IS related to the general plan of the others and 
must be so construed."); 6 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 12, § 1432, at 253 
("Rule 13(g) must be read In conjunction With the other federal rules."). 
92. 441 U.S. 153 (1979). 
93. [d. at 177 In Herbert, the plamtiff sought an order compelling discovery In a 
defamation action. [d. at 156-57. In holding that Judges should not heSitate to exercise 
appropnate control over the discovery process, the Court stated: "[T]he discovery prOVISions, 
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Foman v. Davls,94 the Supreme Court noted the mandate of Rule 1 m 
holding that it is contrary to the spIrit of the Federal Rules for a court to 
aVOId a decIsion on the basIS of "mere techrucalities. "95 However, the 
Supreme Court has also made clear that, although the Rules should be 
"liberally construed, .,. they should not be expanded by disregarding 
plamly expressed limitations."96 Thus, only if the mtent of the framers of 
the Federal Rules is ambIguous regarding the definition of "co-party" 
would it be legitimate to look to policy conSIderations to resolve the cross-
clrum debate. 
IV POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
Because thIS Note concludes from the discussIOn above that the mtent of 
the framers of the Federal Rules IS ambIguous regarding the definition of 
"co-party," a diversIon mto the realm of policy IS mevitable. HistorIcally, 
the pnmary reasons behmd allowmg cross-claims have been to aVOId mUltiple 
suits and to encourage determmation of an entire controversy with the 
fewest procedural steps.97 ConsIstent with these policies, courts generally 
have construed Rule 13(g) broadly m order to settle as many related clrums 
as possible m a smgle proceeding.98 Although the liberal use of cross-clrums 
mcreases the risk that an action will become too complicated, courts can 
like all of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, are subject to the mjunction of Rule 1 that 
they 'be construed to secure the just, speedy, and mexpenslve determmation of every action.'" 
Id. at 177 (emphasis m ongmal). Thus, "the requirement of Rule 26(b)(1) that the matenal 
sought m discovery be 'relevant' should be firmly applied, and the distnct courts should not 
neglect their power to restnct discovery where 'justice requires [protection for] a party or 
person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppreSSIOn, or undue burden or expense ", Id. 
94. 371 U.S. 178 (1962). 
95. Id. at 181-82. In Fornan, a party filed a notice of appeal m federal court from a 
judgment dismlssmg hiS complamt and subsequently filed a notice of appeal from a second 
judgment denYIng lus motions to vacate the first judgment and to amend the complamt. Id. 
at 179. The Supreme Court deCided that, where the first notice of appeal IS held to be 
premature, the appeal from the second judgment should be treated as an effective attempt to 
appeal from the first judgment. Id. at 181. 
96. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 121 (1964). 
97. 6 C. WRIGHT, A. Mn.LER & M. KANE, supra note 12, § 1431, at 229 & n.5. Similar 
purposes underlie third-party clrums under Rule 14. See, e.g., 3 J. MOORE, supra note 11, , 
14.04, at 14-29 (footnote omitted) ("[I]mpleader allows the court to resolve the ultimate 
liabilities In one suit Instead of two. Tlus mcluslve packaging spares the JudiCial system and 
at least some of the parties the waste and expense of multiple suits. Concomitantly, it aVOids 
the possibility of mconslstent judgments."). 
98. 6 C. WRIGHT, A. Mru.ER & M. KANE, ~pra note 12, § 1431, at 230 n.6. Because 
cross-clrums are always pernusslve and never compulsory under the Federal Rules, "a defendant 
must deCide whether it IS best to litigate lus clrum m the same suit or whether it IS better to 
bnng a separate action." WEST'S FEDERAL PRACTICE MANuAL § 7985 (1979) (footnote omitted). 
But see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-213(g)-(h) (1988) (contrumng proVISIons for both compulsory 
and permissive cross-clrums). Courts should not usurp the ability of defendants to make tlus 
tactical deCISion by narrowly construmg Federal Rule 13(g). 
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readily allevIate thIS problem by ordering separate tnals under Rule 13(i).99 
For thIS reason, most scholars encourage broad JOinder of clrums at the 
pleading stage. 100 
The policy reasons for allowing cross-clrums between co-defendants on 
the SaIne level of the captIOn also apply In the context of cross-clrums 
between ongInal defendants and thIrd-party defendants. First, by allOWing 
such cross-claIms, all related matters can be litigated In one proceeding with 
the fewest procedural steps. Parties need not file separate complrunts agrunst 
one another, and motions to consolidate proceedings VIa Rule 42(a), at least 
III thIS respect, become unnecessary Just as the wIdespread use of counter-
claIms and thIrd-party claIms under Rule 13(a)-(b) and Rule 14(a) lowers 
filing expenses and accelerates litIgatIOn, so too would the liberal use of 
cross-claIms under Rule 13(g) reduce. costs and streamline the JudicIal 
machinery 
Second, if cross-clrums of the type discussed In thIS Note are not allowed, 
courts will create an entIre category of cases where related matters cannot 
be litIgated In one proceeding without extra procedural difficulty. Shrewd 
lawyers will delay proceedings by challenging clrums brought under the 
wrong procedural mechanIsm, and abuses may result if lawyers wait to 
assert challenges until close to tnallOI or solely for the purpose of embar-
raSSing OppOSing counsel. Courts have cautIOned In the past that a lawsuit 
should no longer be VIewed "as if it were 'in the nature of a cock-fight,' 
so that 'the litIgant who wIshes to succeed must try and get an advocate 
99. Rule 13(i) prOVides: 
If the court orders separate tnals as prOVided m Rule 42(b), Judgment on a 
counterclrum or cross-clalm may be rendered m accordance with the terms of 
Rule 54(b) when the court has JUrIsdiction so to do, even if the clrums of the 
opposmg party have been diSmIssed or otherwise disposed of. 
FED. R. Crv P 13(i); see also 6 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 12, § 1437, 
at 281-82 (describmg Rule 13(i) m greater detail). Thus, under Rule 13(i), a court has discretion 
to mvoke Rule 42(b) and order separate trials of the clrums m a gIven matter. 
Rule 42(b) prOVides: 
The court, m furtherance of convemence or to aVOid prejudice, or when separate 
trials will be conducIve to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial 
of any clrum, cross-clrum, counterclrum, or trurd-party clrum, or of any separate 
Issue or of any number of clrums, cross-clrums, counterclrums, trurd-party clrums, 
or Issues, always preservmg mVIOlate the right of trial by JUry as declared by the 
Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the United 
States. 
FED. R. Crv P 42(b); see also 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 17, §§ 2387-91, at 277-
304 (describmg Rule 42(b) m greater detail). 
100. See, e.g., 6 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 12, § 1431, at 230. 
101. But see GeorgIa Ports Auth. v. ConstruZlom Meccamche Industnali GenovesI, S.P.A., 
119 F.R.D. 693, 695 n.2 (S.D. Ga. 1988) ("[E]ven if Falcon's construction of Rule 13(g) IS 
correct, any techmcal objection to CMI's cross-clrum would appear to have been wruved by 
delay m P!essmg It."). 
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who IS a game bIrd with the best pluck and the sharpest spurs." , 102 The 
Federal Rules were Intended to supersede thIS "sporting theory of Justice." 103 
As the court In Georgza Ports Authorzty suggested, the Federal Rules 
enVlSlon three types of claIms that defendants may assert: counterclaIms, 
thIrd-party claIms and cross-claIms.l04 Rule 13(a)-(b) prOVIdes that counter-
claIms may be brought agaInst OPPOSIng parties. lOS Rule 14(a) prOVIdes that 
thIrd-party complaInts may be brought agaInst persons not already parties. 106 
And Rule 13(g) prOVIdes that cross-claIms may be asserted agaInst co-
parties. 107 
AssumIng that the framers of the Rules Intended that these be the only 
three types of claIms defendants could brIng and that every such claIm 
should fit Into one of these three categories, one question remaIns: how 
would the framers of the Rules define these categorIes? To accomplish theIr 
purpose, the best method would be to create a system fitting every claIm 
Into one of the three categorIes. To do this withIn the definitional framework 
laId out In Georgza Ports Authority, the first step would be to distingUIsh 
claIms agaInst parties to a lawsuit from claIms agaInst parties not Involved 
In a lawsuit. All possible claims must fit In one of these two groups: claIms 
agaInst parties and claIms agaInst non-parties. Because Rule 14(a) prOVIdes 
for assertion of a thIrd-party complaInt agaInst any "person not a party to 
the action," 108 the only way to assure that all claIms will be categorIzed In 
one of the three categorIes is to allow "cross-claIms" or "counterclaIms" 
agaInst any person already a party to an action. For, unless the uruverse 
of claIms is diVIded Into two perfect halves In thIS way, the temptation will 
eXIst for courts to create by default yet a fourth category of claIms. 
To illustrate the logic underlYIng thIs temptation, suppose one needed to 
know how many lollipops out of ten JackIe perceIved to be red. The best 
method IS to ask JackIe whether she thInks each lollipop IS "red" or "not 
red." OtherwIse, if an open-ended question is asked, the questioner may 
have to deal with an answer like "vermillion." Did JackIe Intend the 
"vermillion" response to be taken as a subset of red, a subset of orange 
or a subset of neither? 
102. Barnett v. Jaspan (In re Barnett), 124 F.2d 1005, 1010 (2d Cir. 1942) (footnote omitted) 
(quoting Manson, Cross-Exammation: A Socratic Fragment, 8 LAW Q. REv 160, 161 (1892». 
103. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d 976, 996 (2d Cir. 1942). '''The Federal Rules 
reject the approach that pleading IS a game of skill In whIch one mIsstep by counsel may be 
declSlve to the outcome and accept the pnnclple that the purpose of pleading IS to facilitate 
a proper deCISIOn on the merits.'" Foman v. DaVIS, 371 U.S. 178, 181-82 (1962) (quotIng 
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957». 
104. Georgia Ports Auth., 119 F.R.D. at 695. 
105. FED. R. CIV. P 13(a)-(b). 
106. FED. R. Crv. P 14(a). 
107. FED. R. Crv P 13(g). 
108. FED. R. Crv P 14(a) (emphasIs added). 
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If thIS line of lOgIC IS the best way to solve the problem at hand, then 
every court, except the Georgza Ports Authority· court, has gone about 
defimng "co-party" m the wrong way Instead of focusmg on the framers' 
probable purpose-to classify all claIms by defendants either as Hurd-party 
claIms, counterclaIms or cross-claIms-courts have tended to divme the 
meanmg of "co-party" from the word itself. For example, m Schwab v. 
Ene Lackawanna Railroad Co. v Sauers,I09 the court concentrated on the 
adversanal relationshIp between the defendant and the thIrd-party defen-
dant. lIO Because of thIS mIstaken focus, the court concluded that these two 
partIes could not be co-partIes withm the meanmg of Rule 13(g). Even the 
court m Fogel, WhICh reached the same conclusIOn as does thIS Note, 
focused on the prefix "co-" rather than on the purpose of the Federal 
Rules as artIculated by Rule 1. 1I1 
Rather than attemptmg to define "co-party" by lookmg at the word 
itself,1I2 a sounder approach IS to define the term withm the context of the 
109. 438 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1971). 
110. [d. at 66; see also McWhIrter Distrib. Co. v. Texaco Inc., 668 F.2d 511, 527 (Temp. 
Emer. Ct. App. 1981) (citing Schwab) ("Texaco and DOE were adverse parties rather than 
co-parties."); Stahl v. OhIO River Co., 424 F.2d 52, 55 (3d Cir. 1970) (emphasIs In ongInal) 
("[C]ross-clatms are filed agatnst co-parties and not agrunst adverse parties."); Capital Care 
Corp. v. Lifetime Corp., No. 88-2682 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 10, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist 
file) ("[Bjefore the thIrd-party defendants filed theIr crossclatms, theIr relationshIp to the non-
sUing defendants was sufficIently non-adverse to qualify the latter as co-parties."); Pitcavage 
v. Mastercraft Boat Co., 632 F Supp. 842, 849 (M.D. Pa. 1985) (citing Stahl) ("Cross-clatms 
are filed agatnst co-partIes and not agatnst adverse parties. "). But see Georgia Ports Auth., 
119 F.R.D. at 695 (critiCIzing the suggestion of some courts that onglnal defendants and thIrd-
party defendants are not "co-parties" because they are adverse). 
Ill. Fogel v. United Gas Improvement Co., 32 F.R.D. 202, 204 (E.D. Pa. 1963). The Fogel 
court did not mention Rule 1 or the 1946 atnendment to Rule 14{a) In its opinIOn. When 
faced with the contention that "co-party" meant "equal party, as for Instance one of several 
onglnal defendants," the court stated sImply. that "[tjhIS contention IS Incorrect." [d. Citing 
the dictionary definition of the prefix "co-" was the only support the Fogel court gave for 
its deCISIon. [d. 
112. If courts inSiSt on fOCUSing on the term "co-party," the Fogel court arguably was 
correct In construing it to allow cross-claims between onglnal defendants and thIrd-party 
defendants. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990) defines "co-" as "[aj prefix meaning 
with, In conjunction, JOint, JOintly, unitedly, and not separately[.j" [d. at 256. That source 
further defines "party" as follows: 
A person concerned or haVing or taking part In any affrur, matter, transaction, 
or proceeding, conSidered indiVIdually. A "party" to an action IS a person whose 
natne IS desIgnated on record as platntiff or defendant. Term, In general, means 
one haVing nght to control proceedings, to make defense, to adduce and cross-
exatnlne witnesses, and to appeal from Judgment. 
[d. at 1122 (citations omitted). 
Both onglnal defendants and thIrd-party defendants can be conSIdered to be particIpating 
"in conjunction with" a gIven proceeding. Both such parties have control over legal proceedings 
and are desIgnated on record with the court. In fact, In the case of an Indemnity clatm, an 
allegation between an onglnal defendant and a thIrd-party defendant IS one In WhICh one party 
asserts that the other party must stand In its shoes if liability IS found to attach. Thus, In the 
case of an Indemmty clatm by an ongInal defendant agatnst a thud-party defendant, It would 
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Federal Rules. If Rule 14(a) thtrd-party chums are categorized as "not party 
to the action" chums, all other clrums assertable by defendants need only 
be categonzed either as counterclaims or cross-clrums. To do thts, the 
umverse of remaimng clrums should be divIded once agrun according to a 
"something" I"not somethtng" classification system. Without thts divIsIon, 
the problems associated with any definition of "co-party" are Immediately 
foreseeable. For Instance, the Stahl court's definition of "co-parties" as 
"parties on the same sIde of the mrun litigation"lI3 may leave some clrums 
uncategonzed because this definition and the standard definition of a 
counterclaim are not mutually exclusIveY4 LikewIse, because the eXIsting 
be unfrur to procedurally mhibit such a clrum-by requmng the filing of an mdependent 
action-merely because of the fortuitous circumstance that the plruntiff did not sue the thlrd-
party defendant m the ongmal action. 
113. Stahl, 424 F.2d at 55; see also Rochester Am. Ins. Co. v. Cassell Truck Lmes, Inc., 
195 Kan. 51, 54, 402 P.2d 782, 784 (1965) (applymg KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-213(g» (stating 
cross·clrums are "between parties on the same Side of the case"); Bunge v. Yager, 236 Minn. 
245, 255, 52 N.W.2d 446, 451 (1952) (applymg MINN. R. CIv. P 13.07) (suggesting that co-
parties be defined as those parties which are "aligned on the same Side of the litigation"). 
114. The Stahl court's definition of "co-party" IS unattractive for three reasons. First, 
determmmg which parties are on the same Side of the mam litigation IS extremely difficult. 
Given the countless postures 10 which modem day litigants find themselves, it IS often Impossible 
to deternune on whose Side any gIVen litigant IS. "As between the third-party plruntiffs and 
the third-party defendants, it IS converuent to regard them as adversanes, at least for the 
purpose of counterclrums, even though, as a practical matter, it often happens that their 
pnmary objective IS the common defense agrunst plruntiff's clalIDs." Capital Care Corp. v. 
Lifetime Corp., No. 88-2682 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 10, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). 
Compare ,d. ("In a sense, both the ongmal defendants and the third-party defendants are 
sunilarly situated, m that each IS bemg charged (by someone) with liability for the clrums 
asserted by the plruntiffs.") with Hansen v. Shearson/Amencan Express, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 
246, 248 (E.D. Pa. 1987) ("To the extent that Manfredo and Guptill both stood to lose if 
Hansen prevailed they rrught be VIewed as 'parties on the same Side of the mrun litigation' 
and the conclUSiOn rrught be reached that a clrum by Guptill agrunst Manfredo IS a cross-
clrum."). Although explanatory notes to one state cross-clalID rule suggest that "Rule 13(g) 
regulates clrums between parties on the same Side of the versus[,]" MAss. R. CIv. P 13(g) 
reporters' notes (emphasis m ongmal), tins IS sunilarly unhelpful. Ongmal defendants and 
third-party defendants both appear on the opposite Side of the plruntiff/ongmal defendant 
"versus," and before cross-clrums are asserted between ongmal defendants and third-party 
defendants, such parties have no legal relationship whatsoever other than that both parties 
happen to be mvolved m the same proceeding. 
Second, aside from bemg adopted only In dicta by the Stahl court, defirung "co-parties" 
as those parties on the same Side of the mrun litigation would be unduly burdensome on the 
courts. Judges would have to decide, through a kind of balancmg test, whether litigants are 
adverse or non-adverse towards one another. An example of this balancmg approach IS found 
In the case of In re Queeny/Connthos, 503 F Supp. 361, 364 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (emphasIs In 
ongmal) (citation omitted): 
To be on the same Side of the litigation these parties need not have an Identity 
of Interests, ISSUes or positions with respect to each other, but need only stand 
In a sImilar posture In relation to clrums of opposmg parties brought agamst 
each of them, even though such clalIDS are brought separately, by different 
parties, and on different legal theones. Certrunly the Queeny Interests, owners 
and operators of the Queeny, and the products defendants, builders of and 
manufacturers of eqwpment for the Queeny, are more easily Identified as standing 
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definition of a counterclrum only allows such clrums between those parties 
who are "opposmg parties,"lIs some clrums related to the subject matter of 
the ongmal lawsuit will not be classifiable as either counterclrums or cross-
clrums with Murray's non-dichotomous definitlOn of "co-party," that IS, 
"parties havmg like status."116 For, as thls Note illustrates, It IS entirely 
possible for one party to have a clrum agrunst another party who IS not an 
opposmg party yet who IS not a party of like status either.· 
on the same side of tlus litigation than as on opposing sIdes. On the opposing 
sIde are parties such as the Connthos Interests and BP/SohiO wluch IS also a 
plaintiff In the products liability action. ThIS Court has already determmed that 
the Queeny was at fault In the colliSIon between it and the Connthos. The 
Queeny Interests allege that the products defendants, builders and suppliers of 
the Queeny, are liable for the colliSIon under a products liability theory. The 
Connthos mterests, BP/Soluo, and other claimants on the opposing SIde of the 
litigation are the parties WhICh were Injured as a result of the actions of Queeny. 
Thus, on one SIde stands those parties actually or allegedly responsible for the 
colliSIon, and on the other SIde stands those parties Injured or damaged. 
Thus, the Stahl definition of "co-party" demands a case-by-case analYSIS, WhIch reqUIres a 
conSIderable amount of time on the part of courts to admiruster. Instead of fOCUSing on the 
configuration of the parties and theIr clrums, a sounder approach lies In diVIding all clrums 
by parties to an action Into two mutually exclUSIve categones-counterclaIms and cross-claims. 
Tlurd, because the Stahl approach requires a balancmg scheme, it-like all other Interest-
weiglung approaches-will be subject to marupulation by courts. If a court finds a litigant's 
claim has merit, it could construe "co-party" broadly to allow that claim's assertion. Con-
versely, if a court finds a litigant's claim lackmg m merit, it could construe "co-party" 
narrowly to prohibit that claim's assertion. Even if a court merely dismIsses a claim without 
prejudice, such marupulation of the tenn "co-party" would VIolate the SPIrit of the Federal 
Rules, wluch require courts to deCIde cases on theIr merits rather than on procedural techru-
ca1ities. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text. An extreme case of marupulation could 
occur if claims of the type discussed m thIS Note are allowed under Rule 13(h) Instead of 
Rule 13(g). For, unlike the practice before Rule 13(h)'s amendment In 1966 of 
jOIrung parties "as defendants," the parties are to be aligned according to theIr 
Interests. Specifically, the Note states that "the party pleading the claim IS to be 
regarded as a plaintiff and the additional parties as plaintiffs or defendants as 
the case may be, and amended Rules 19 and 20 are to be applied In the usual 
fasluon." . Once the parties are aligned according to their actual mterest In the 
suit, then the court must determine whether federal junsdiction will be affected 
by their addition. If the added party's real Interest IS with plaintiff and lus 
citizenslup IS the same as defendant, then he carmot be JOined for lus presence 
will destroy the preeXisting diversity, unless a compUlsory counterclaim IS Involved. 
Of course, if the added party IS correctly aligned as a defendant, then the 
Junsdictional pnncipies applicable to counterclaims and cross-claims will govern. 
6 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 12, § 1434, at 266-67 (footnotes omitted) 
(quoting FED. R. Crv P 13 adVISOry committee's note). As one can observe, if parties are 
allowed to assert the type of claims discussed In tlus Note under Rule 13(h), a court's 
marupulation of the tenn "co-party" could easily prevent an entire controversy from being 
deCIded In one forum because a court could refuse to hear part of a claim on JUrIsdictional 
grounds. Under Rule 13(g), on the other hand, courts would always have ancillary JUrISdiction 
over cross-claims between such parties, and the balanCing of parties' Interests In a glven piece 
of litigauon would be unnecessary. See supra note 70. 
115. FED. R. Crv P 13 (a)-(b). 
116. Murray v. Haverford Hosp. Corp., 278 F SUpp. 5, 6 (B.D. Pa. 1968). 
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As a result, under both the Stahl and Murray approaches, some defen-
dants' chums will never be classifiable under the Federal Rules. Parties will 
be forced forever to file separate complaints and, subsequently, motions 
for consolidation under Rule 42(a). Only by allOWing counterclaIms agaInst 
opposmg parties and cross-claims agaInst non-opposmg parties was the court 
In Georgia Ports Authority able to evade the definitional quagmrre sur-
rounding the term "co-party."lI7 
V. PROPOSAL 
In light of the conflict among authorities over the mearung of the term 
"co-party," the Federal Rules should be amended to clear up the confUSIon. 
First, Rule 13(g) should define "co-party" explicitly. A clear definitional 
clause added to that .Rule would make it unnecessary for courts to examine 
the Intent of the framers of the Federal Rules and relevant policy conSId-
erations. If the AdVISOry Committee on Civil Rulesl18 wIshed to allow cross-
claIms between ongInal defendants and thIrd-party defendants, it could say 
so explicitly; if the AdVISOry Committee on Civil Rules wanted to prohibit 
such cross-clrums, it could articulate that, toO.119 
117. GeorgIa Ports Auth., 119 F.R.D. at 695. 
118. The AdVISOry Committee on Civil Rules IS the body that first conSIders proposed rule 
changes. See FEDERAL Crvn. JUDICIAL PROCEDURE AND RULES XXI-XXII (West 1990) for a list 
of the members of the AdVISOry Committee on Civil Rules as constituted March 1, 1990. Tros 
body was appomted pursuant to an act passed by Congress July 11, 1958 (28 U.S.C. § 331 
(1988» authoIlzmg the JudiCIal Conference of the United States to make a continuous study 
of the Federal Rules. See also 28 U.S.C.A. § 2073(a)(2) (West Supp. 1990) ("The JudiCIal 
Conference may authoIlZe the appomtment of committees to asSISt the Conference by rec-
ommending rules to be prescribed under section 2072 of tills title."). According to 28 U.S.C.A. 
§ 2073(a)(I), "[t}he JudiCIal Conference shall prescribe and publish the procedures for the 
conSIderation of proposed rules[.}" 
119. Under the current statutory scheme, the U.S. Supreme Court has the power "to 
prescribe general rules of practice and procedure" for federal diStIlct courts. 28 U.S.C.A. § 
2072 (West Supp. 1990). "The Supreme Court shall transmit to the Congress not later than 
May 1 of the year m wroch a rule prescribed under section 2072 IS to become effective a copy 
of the proposed rule." 28 U.S.C.A. § 2074(a) (West Supp. 1990). If Congress does nothmg 
witron the seven-month penod prOVIded for by the statute, the new rule goes mto effect. [d. 
("Such rule shall take effect no earlier than December 1 of the year m wroch such rule IS so 
transmitted unless otherwIse prOVIded by law."). 
However, the JudiCIal Conference Committee on Rules of Practice, Procedure, and EVIdence 
("Standing Committee") and the AdVISOry Committee on Civil Rules are the two bodies that 
continuously study the operations of the Federal Rules. FEDERAL Crvn. JUDICIAL PROCEDURE 
AND RULES, supra note 118, at X. The Standing Committee coordinates the work of the 
AdVISOry Committee on Civil Rules, makes suggestions of proposals to be studied by them, 
conSIders proposals recommended by the AdVISOry Committee and transmits such proposals 
with its recommendation to the JudiCIal Conference. [d. at XII. If the JudicIal Conference 
approves of a proposal, it formally forwards its report and recommendations to the U.S. 
Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C.A. § 331 (West Supp. 1990). For a complete disCllsslon of the rule-
amending process, see 28 U.S.C.A. § 331; 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2072-2074; and FEDERAL Crvn. 
JUDICIAL PROCEDURE AND RULES, supra note 118, at X-XIII. 
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For the reasons discussed In thIS Note, however, the term "co-party" 
should be defined as "any party that IS not an OPPOSIng party."I20 ThIS 
definition would divIde and lOgIcally categorIZe all possible claIms a defen-
dant may assert agaInst partIes to a lawsuit Into two all-InclusIve groups. 
Every claIm between defendants and thIrd-party defendants would have to 
be, by definition, eIther a counterclaIm or a cross-claIm. Furthermore, 
defimng "co-party" as "any party that IS not an OPPOSIng party" would 
evade the line-draWIng problems caused by (or resulting from) attempts to 
fit counterclaIms and cross-claIms Into non-mutually exclUSIve pIgeonholes. 
In addition to amending Rule 13(g), Rule 14(a) should be amended to 
allow "cross-claIms agaInst other co-partIes, as prOVIded In Rule 13." The 
definition gIven "co-party" In Rule 13(g) also should be Incorporated by 
reference Into Rule 14(a). Tills would elimInate any ambIguity about the 
availability of cross-claIms between ongInal defendants and thIrd-party 
defendants and make the Federal Rules Internally conSIstent. 121 
CONCLUSION 
The definition of "co-party" under Rule 13(g) has broad Implications for 
the litIgation process. Amencans have filed more than 200,000 CIvil cases 
120. Oklahoma has enacted a rule which prOVides that "[a] pleading may state as a cross-
chum any chum by one party agrunst any party who IS not an opposmg party[.]" OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 12, § 2013(G) (West Supp. 1991). However, the committee comment to § 2013 states 
that subsection G applies only to "a c1rum asserted by a party' agrunst another party on the 
same Side of the action, such as a defendant agrunst a co-defendant or a plruntiff agrunst a 
co-plruntiff. It does not apply to a c1rum asserted by a defendant agrunst a plruntiff or agrunst 
a third-party defendant." [d. committee comment. Although thIs comment undoubtedly was 
mtended merely to distingUish cross-c1rums from counterclrums and third-party c1rums brought 
under § 2013(A)-(B) and § 2014(A) (Oklahoma's respective counterparts to Federal Rules 13(a)-
(b) and 14(a», the Oklahoma statute suggests that any definition of "co-party" under the 
Federal Rules should state explicitly that "co-party" encompasses the relationshIp between 
ongmal defendants and tlurd-party defendants when Rules 13(a)-(b) or 14(a) are mapplicable. 
For a more detailed descnption of the rationale underlYIng Oklahoma's cross-c1rum prOVISion, 
see Fraser, Counterclalfns, Cross-ClaIms, and Third-Party ClaIms Under the Oklahoma Pleading 
Code, 39 OKLA. L. REv I, 12-14 (1986). Professor Fraser's article, whIch was written before 
Oklahoma's cross-c1rum provISIon was amended m 1988, argued that "co-party" withIn § 
2013(G) "should be liberally construed so that all c1rums agrunst parties to an action that anse 
out of a transaction or occurrence can be Jomed." [d. at 13. He continued: "The Oklahoma 
Supreme Court should mterpret section 2013(G) as permitting a party to an action to assert 
any c1rum that arises out of a transaction or occurrence that IS already subject to the Junsdiction 
of the court agrunst a person who IS already a party to the action." [d. at 14. Accepting 
Professor Fraser's suggestion that, "to aVOid the possibility that thiS section will be construed 
techrucally, section 2013(G) should be amended," the Oklahoma Legislature m 1988 adopted 
language consistent with Fraser's proposal. Compare Id. with OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 
20 13 (G). Today, a comment to the 1988 amendment of § 2013 contruned m the Oklahoma 
Statutes Annotated by Professor Fraser states that the amendment "makes it unnecessary for 
the courts to determme who IS a co-party." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2013 comment. 
121. To make the Federal Rules completely conSistent, the AdVISOry Committee on Civil 
Rules should follow the lead of Montana and add the words "or co-party" to the end of 
Federal Rule 18(a). See MONT. R. Crv. P 18(a) adVISOry committee's note to Sept. 29, 1967 
amendment ("[T]he words 'or co-party' are added to the Montana amendment for consistency 
With the prOVISions of thiS amendment for cross-claims and Rule 13(g). "). 
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in United States distnct courts each year smce 1982,122 and defendants and 
tlnrd-party defendants frequently must assert clrums agamst one another. 
Wlnchever definition of "co-parties" IS accepted-either those parties on 
the same sIde of the mam litigation, those parties havmg like status or those 
parties that are not opposing parties-it is clear that each of these definitions 
will have sIgnificant consequences for litigants. Whether a court allows 
cross-claims between ongmal defendants and thrrd-party defendants or 
compels these parties to file separate complrunts agrunst one another, the 
definition of "co-party" matters because it has the potential to create extra 
filings and procedural difficulties thereby costing parties and courts time 
and money. 
Until the Federal Rules are amended, "co-party" should be defined 
according to the policIes that lie behmd the Federal Rules. There IS no 
persuasIve authority showmg that the framers of the Rules mtended other-
WIse. Rule 1 's mandate that the Federal Rules- "be construed to secure the 
Just, speedy, and mexpensive determmation of every action" should be 
gIven broad effect. l23 Because the Rules presume that as many related clrums 
as possible be resolved m a smgle proceeding,l24 the only legitimate way to 
define "co-party" IS to examme the purpose of the Federal Rules. Given 
the absence of any policy reasons disfavonng cross-clrums between ongmal 
defendants and tlnrd-party defendants, the Federal Rules should permit such 
cross-clrums. 
122. According to the latest available figures, 233,529 total CIvil cases were commenced m 
U.S. distnct courts dunng the twelve month penod ending June 30, 1989. 1989 ADMIN. OFF. 
OF THE U.S. CTS. ANN. REp. 8-9 (Table 4). Total CIvil cases commenced for other years ending 
June 30 were as follows: 1982, 206,193; 1983, 241,842; 1984, 261,485; 1985, 273,670; 1986, 
254,828; 1987, 239,185; 1988, 239,634. Id. 
123. See also Bauer, SchIavone: An Un-Fortune-ate Illustration oj the Supreme Court's 
Role as Interpreter oj the Federal Rules oj Civil Procedure, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REv 720, 
730 (1988) ("Although [Rule 1] obVIOusly does not prOVIde an answer to any specific question 
of the mterpretation of any of the Federal Rules, it defines a context or, if you will, a 
predisposition agamst unnecessarily ngld or grudging mterpretations of the Rules. "); Doble, 
supra note 17, at 262 n.3 (citations omitted) (the author was a member of the AdVISOry 
Committee appomted to draft the Federal Rules) ("The committee meant every word of [the 
Rule 1] sentence, and it IS smcerely hoped that federal Judges will mterpret and apply the rules 
m thIS SPIrit. "). 
124. As three scholars have stated, "In keepmg with tms policy [of aVOIding mUltiple suits] 
the courts generally have construed [Rule 13(g)] liberally m order to settle as many related 
clrums as possible m a smgle action." 6 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 12, 
§ 1431, at 229-30 (footnote omitted); see also LASA Per L'Industna Del Marmo Socleta Per 
AzIom v. Alexander, 414 F.2d 143, 146 (6th Cir. 1969); Provldential-Dev. Co. v. United States 
Steel Co., 236 F.2d 277, 281 (10th Cir. 1956); Blrur v. Cleveland TWIst Drill Co., 197 F.2d 
842, 845 (7th Cir. 1952); Old Homestead Bread Co. v. Contmental Bakmg Co., 47 F.R.D. 
560, 563-64 n.7 (D. Colo. 1969). 
